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INTRODUCTION
There are ninety-four federal district courts in the United States, but
nearly half of the six thousand patent cases filed in 2013 were filed in just
two of those courts: the District of Delaware and the Eastern District of
Texas.1 In the Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware—

1 Based on statistics from September 16, 2013, 6134 patent cases were expected to be filed in
federal district courts in 2013; of those, 1464 were expected to be filed in the District of Delaware
and 1327 were expected to be filed in the Eastern District of Texas. See Press Release, Perkins
Coie, Unprecedented Patent Case Concentration (Sept. 16, 2013), available at
http://www.perkinscoie.com/news/news_detail.aspx?news=1476; see also Ryan Davis, Eastern Texas
Judge Has Nation’s Busiest Patent Docket, LAW360 (May 13, 2014, 7:42 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/536886/eastern-texas-judge-has-nation-s-busiest-patent-docket,
archived at http://perma.cc/999J-6LXZ (explaining the reasons underlying the high volume of
patent litigation brought in the Eastern District of Texas).
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neither of which is home to a major technology industry2—patent litigation
comprises an astounding proportion of each court’s docket: twenty-eight
percent of 2013 filings in the Eastern District of Texas were patent cases
while fifty-six percent of 2013 filings in the District of Delaware were
patent cases.3 In fact, the two judges with the busiest patent dockets—
Judge Rodney Gilstrap in the Eastern District of Texas and Judge Leonard
Stark in the District of Delaware—have larger patent dockets than does the
entire Central District of California, the district that receives the third
most patent cases in the country.4
While the popularity of the Eastern District of Texas and the District of
Delaware with patent plaintiffs is a relatively recent phenomenon,5 the
litigation tactic of selecting the court that offers the greatest odds of
success—otherwise known as forum shopping—is not. Forum shopping has
been a significant concern in the patent system for over forty years.6 Forum

2 See Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 407 (2010)
(explaining that unlike other top destinations for patent cases, Delaware and Texas have neither
large populations nor prominent technology industries).
3 See FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS DECEMBER 2013 (2013), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStatistics/district-courts-december2013.aspx (select “Delaware” or “Eastern Texas”; then follow “Go” hyperlink) (noting that in 2013,
2374 total cases were filed in Delaware and 5330 total cases were filed in the Eastern District of
Texas); Statistics Summary, Lex Machina, U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware (on
file with author) (noting that in 2013, 1335 of the filings in Delaware were patent cases); Statistics
Summary, Lex Machina, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (on file with
author) (noting that in 2013, 1494 of the filings in the Eastern District of Texas were patent cases).
In third place for percentage of patent cases was the Northern District of California, which
devoted about 3% of its overall civil docket to patent cases in 2010. Henry Wong, An Empirical
Look at the District Courts Handling Patent Cases 8 ( Jan. 20, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.socialaw.com/slbook/judgeyoung12/HBW%20Final%20Paper.pdf.
4 Judges Gilstrap and Stark had 941 and 532 patent cases, respectively, added to their dockets
in 2013; in contrast, the Central District of California received 399 patent case filings that same
year. Davis, supra note 1. The changes in joinder rules from the America Invents Act partially
explain the incredibly high number of cases filed with Judges Gilstrap and Stark. See Christopher
A. Cotropia et al., Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2014) (manuscript at 2) (demonstrating that the rise in raw numbers of patent suits since 2010 was
driven by changes to the joinder rules); see also David O. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 652, 700-06 (2013) (describing the legislative process behind the change in the joinder rules).
5 From 1995 to 1999, Delaware received 3.2% of all patent filings in the United States, while
the Eastern District of Texas did not rank in the top ten venues for patent litigation. Kimberly A.
Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV.
889, 903 (2001).
6 Congress felt that patent forum shopping was so problematic that in 1982, it created the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in an effort to curb the practice. Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.); see also Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit—1981: Hearings on H.R. 2405 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, & the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
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shopping is generally understood to be driven by the search for favorable
substantive law, favorable procedural rules, or “home court advantage.”7
However, the persistence of forum shopping in patent law cannot be fully
explained by substantive legal differences or home court advantage.8 Patent
litigants cannot obtain substantive legal differences by forum shopping
because all federal district courts are bound by the same legal rules that
come from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Furthermore,
the fact that the majority of patent cases are filed in district courts that do
not have sizeable technology industries indicates that most forum shopping
is not the result of major technology companies seeking the advantages of
litigating at the nearest courthouse.9
That leaves procedural differences. This Article theorizes that forum
shopping in patent law is driven, at least in part, by federal district courts
competing for litigants. This competition occurs primarily through
procedural and administrative differentiation among courts. All patent
infringement cases are heard in federal court and are therefore governed by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Despite the existence of the Federal
Rules, district courts across the United States have adopted local rules
specifically for patent cases. Intriguingly, some districts have adopted local
patent rules despite almost never hearing patent cases in their courtrooms,10

Cong. 6 (1981) (statement of C.J. Howard T. Markey, Court of Customs and Patent Appeals)
(discussing the problems of forum shopping in patent law); id. at 50 (statement of J. Jancin, Jr.,
President-Elect, American Patent Law Association) (discussing forum shopping stemming from
the lack of national uniformity in patent law); H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20-21 (1981) (explaining
how forum shopping exists because some circuits are “pro-patent” and some are “anti-patent”);
Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal Procedures:
Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 370 (1975) (arguing that forum shopping in patent law
was “extensive”); Jack Q. Lever, Jr., The New Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Part I), 64 J.
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 178, 186-97 (1982) (describing congressional motivation behind the creation of
the Federal Circuit); Ellen E. Sward & Rodney F. Page, The Federal Courts Improvement Act: A
Practitioner’s Perspective, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 385, 387-88 (1984) (discussing congressional concern
about patent forum shopping and the detrimental effects of uncertainty on patent values).
7 See infra Part I.
8 See Moore, supra note 5, at 938 (concluding that a “concrete explanation of forum selection
[in patent law] is often elusive”); see also Lemley, supra note 2, at 428 (evaluating district courts
empirically across a range of characteristics consistently identified with forum shopping and
finding that the traditional theoretical conception of forum shopping matches with the practice
“only in part”).
9 See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1463-64 (2010) (finding that
patent cases cluster outside of traditional technology centers due to plaintiff-friendly procedures
and no restrictions on forum shopping).
10 See Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming
2015) (manuscript at 18), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2459785 (noting that the explanation
for patent local rules is, in some districts, “less [than] obvious”).
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suggesting that local patent rules serve a signaling function for courts
looking to attract potential patent litigants.
Beyond procedural distinctions, courts can compete for litigants by
adopting administrative norms and practices that align with plaintiff
preferences, such as predictable judge assignment procedures, favorable
case management norms, and preferential motions practices. Conversely, a
court can dissuade litigants from filing in its courtrooms by adopting norms
that are contrary to litigant preferences, such as randomization of judge
assignments and adoption of case management norms which do not appeal
to particular litigants. To encourage filings, court-created norms must be
consistent and predictable; in contrast, to discourage filings, courts must
seek to decrease predictability. In essence, maintaining trial management
practices in a predictable manner that favors a particular type of litigant
(almost always plaintiffs) allows district courts to compete for the business
of litigation, while adopting case management practices that litigants
disfavor or that are unpredictable reduces a court’s ability to attract forum
shoppers.
Appreciating the impact of court competition in patent litigation
provides numerous explanatory benefits over the current litigant-centric
theory of forum shopping. First, court competition offers an explanation
for the prevalence of patent forum shopping in the Federal Circuit era.11
Although the Federal Circuit was created in an effort to eliminate the
forum shopping caused by regional variations in patent law,12 forum
shopping remains rampant today. Court competition theory suggests that
by centralizing patent appeals in the Federal Circuit—and thus unifying the
law nationally—the relative importance of distinctions between district
court administrative practices increased significantly. The presence of a
centralized appellate court allows district courts to better leverage case
management distinctions in an effort to attract patent litigants.
Second, court competition for patent cases better explains the appeal of
particular district courts to plaintiffs. The traditional account of outcome- and
geographic-based distinctions as the basis for forum shopping cannot
account for district courts with similar characteristics that experience vastly
different numbers of case filings. For instance, the Eastern District of Texas

11 See generally Lemley, supra note 2 (collecting data about the effect of different factors
specific to district courts on patentees’ choices of where to file); Moore, supra note 5, at 901-24
(suggesting that the venue and identity of the filing parties can affect outcomes in patent
litigation, in turn leading to forum shopping and its adverse consequences).
12 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1989) (describing Congress’s motivations for creating the Federal Circuit).
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receives over 1300 patent cases annually,13 while the Eastern District of
Oklahoma has received only two patent cases in the past decade.14
Similarly, likelihood of success at trial cannot fully explain litigant choice.15
Empirical studies find that patentees are most successful when bringing
suit in the Northern District of Texas, yet litigants largely prefer the
Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware.16 Court competition
theory, in contrast, better maps the forum shopping that occurs in patent
cases: courts that adopt procedures that appeal to patent litigants tend to
receive more patent filings than courts that offer less appealing procedures.
Lastly, court competition theory links patent forum shopping with
other legal areas that have also experienced high rates of forum shopping,
most particularly bankruptcy law.17 Bankruptcy judges have engaged in
many of the same practices that district courts have used to attract litigants.
The primary difference is that for patent cases, some courts have actively
discouraged litigants from filing in their courts;18 similar examples of courts
actively discouraging filings are not present in the literature on bankruptcy
court competition.
The fact that bankruptcy and patent law are the two fields of federal law
that have experienced large amounts of court competition suggests that
legal fields with specialized judges may be more prone to court
competition. This may be true for a number of reasons. First, specialized
courts may receive greater benefits from successfully attracting litigants
than do courts of general jurisdiction and therefore are more likely to
attempt to increase case filings. Scholars have suggested that specialist
bankruptcy judges seek to attract cases in order to increase the power of the
court.19 By increasing case filings, specialized judges justify their specialized
position and expand the court’s influence and prestige. Second, specialist
judges may have unique non-bureaucratic reasons to compete for cases.
Specialists more easily obtain the prestige associated with being an expert

13

See supra note 1.
Lemley, supra note 2, at 435 app. A.
15 See id. at 410 (“In short, if patentees or accused infringers are to pick a forum only by win
rate, both sides should probably be picking different districts than they currently do.”).
16 Id. at 407-09 tbl.3.
17 For a broader discussion of similar issues experienced by bankruptcy courts with respect to
forum shopping, see LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG
CASES IS CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 25-48 (2005).
18 See, e.g., infra subsection II.A.2.c (discussing the Eastern District of Virginia’s attempts to
discourage patent litigants from filing in the District’s Alexandria Division).
19 See generally LOPUCKI, supra note 17.
14
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jurist than do generalist judges.20 Indeed, much of what motivates
generalist judges to pursue increased patent filings is the ability to
specialize. In many respects, some judges on the Eastern District of Texas
and the District of Delaware operate like specialist patent judges.
The history of court competition in patent and bankruptcy law has
normative implications for policymakers. The prevalence of court
competition in areas of specialized adjudication suggests that lawmakers
contemplating new, specialized courts should carefully consider—and
limit—future courts’ abilities to attract litigation. In particular, lawmakers
should consider restricting venue options in specialized legal areas to
reduce court competition. Furthermore, attention should be paid to the
oversight capabilities of appellate courts tasked with policing the case
management practices of trial courts in specialized legal fields.
Forum shopping has fundamentally altered the landscape of patent
litigation in ways detrimental to the patent system as a whole.21 Court
competition creates even more problems, ranging from reduced trust in the
judicial process to uneven playing fields for litigants. Congress and legal
academics have proposed a variety of solutions to reduce forum shopping.
Those proposals usually involve either increased venue restriction for
patent cases or the creation of a specialized patent trial court—essentially,
all proposals involve limiting choice for litigants. This Article sketches out
possible modifications to patent case assignment rules that could be used—
possibly in conjunction with venue restrictions—to reduce both forum
shopping and court competition. Three potential modifications are
examined. First, Congress could require district courts to randomize their
assignment procedures. Second, patent cases could be assigned randomly to
a subset of district court judges. Currently, Congress is engaged in just such
an experiment on a small scale: the Patent Pilot Program (PPP) allows
qualifying districts to assign patent cases to a small group of judges within
the district.22 Third, patent cases could be assigned by a judicial panel,
similar to the one used for Multi-District Litigation (MDL). This Article
also addresses jurisdictional concerns involved in employing such
assignment methods. Ultimately, while the more radical case assignment
procedures would reduce forum shopping and court competition for patent
cases, they would also increase litigation costs for all patent plaintiffs—not
20 See id. at 45-47 (describing one particular bankruptcy judge’s status as a “bankruptcy
celebrity”); see also infra subsection II.B.1.
21 See Fromer, supra note 9, at 1464-65 (discussing the negative results of widespread forum
shopping).
22 See infra subsection III.C.2.
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just forum shopping plaintiffs. Thus, this Article supports a more modest
fix: a randomization requirement for federal district court judge
assignment.
This Article’s argument proceeds in three parts. Part I offers an
overview of the literature on forum shopping. That literature largely
understands forum shopping as revolving around the search for favorable
substantive and procedural law, while largely ignoring any active role for
courts and judges in the process.
After establishing the theoretical foundations of forum shopping, Part
II provides a historical account of forum shopping in patent law, beginning
with the pre–Federal Circuit era before turning to current practices.
Profiles of three district courts—the District of Delaware, the Eastern
District of Texas, and the Eastern District of Virginia—serve as a case
study. As a partial explanation for the existence of forum shopping in
patent cases, this Part introduces the theory of court competition. Building
on the case study, this Part examines the trial practices that courts can use
to influence venue decisions. Additionally, this Part offers possible
explanations for courts’ interest in competing for patent cases, such as
increased judicial prestige, personal satisfaction, and indirect budgetary
benefits.
Part III explores the normative implications of court competition by
specialized courts. In doing so, it connects the Article’s description of court
competition for patent cases with the literature of court competition in
bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy scholars have proposed increased
randomization as a means of reducing court competition. Building on those
proposals, this Part examines three potential avenues for randomizing
patent case assignment.
I. FORUM SHOPPING
Forum shopping has long been considered “a national legal pastime.”23
While the fairness of forum shopping has been hotly debated among jurists
and academics,24 litigants regard the choice of venue as just one tool among

23 J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L.
REV. 317, 333 (1967).
24 Compare Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 512 n.12 (4th Cir. 1987) (“There is nothing
inherently evil about forum-shopping.”), and Atl. Star, [1974] A.C. 436 (H.L.) 471 (appeal taken
from Eng.) (Simon of Glaisdale, L.J., dissenting) (stating that forum shopping “should be a
matter neither for surprise nor for indignation”), with Fromer, supra note 9, at 1464-65 (explaining
the “three principal concerns” of forum shopping in patent law).

2015]

Court Competition for Patent Cases

639

many in the litigation toolkit.25 Venue choice can, among other things, lead
to larger verdicts,26 favorable substantive law,27 more permissive statute-oflimitation periods,28 or sympathetic juries.29 Litigants may face a host of
different venue options: between state and federal court, between various
state courts, or between different federal courts. Forum shopping can
involve international venue considerations as well.30
Existing legal scholarship on forum shopping has almost universally
focused on the actions of plaintiffs and defendants.31 In the traditional
account, forum shopping involves three steps: (1) determining which
forum(s) meet the prerequisites for subject matter jurisdiction, personal

25 The ability to file a case in one of a number of different courts has been an important part
of litigation since the Supreme Court’s 1878 decision in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Since
Pennoyer, the Supreme Court has attempted to clamp down on the more egregious abuses of “tag”
jurisdiction. However, many of these decisions have increased parties’ ability to forum shop. For
example, International Shoe Co. v. Washington—the preeminent case on personal jurisdiction—
established more sensible jurisdictional principles than Pennoyer, but it also expanded state (and
by extension federal) court jurisdiction to defendants with “minimum contacts” with the forum.
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The minimum contacts standard means that national corporations are
more likely to be subject to jurisdiction in a variety of fora, increasing the ability of clever
plaintiffs to shop for the most advantageous venue.
26 See Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553,
556 (1989) (“Especially in tort cases, venue often determines the size of a verdict because the
generosity of juries varies from one location to another.”).
27 See id. at 558 (noting that forum shopping in divorce cases results from a desire to “evade
overly restrictive home-state divorce laws”); see also Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A
Unifying Theory for Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 266-67 (1991)
(arguing that plaintiffs forum shop to obtain more favorable law).
28 See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 772 n.1 (1984) (involving a libel suit
brought in New Hampshire where relatively few magazines were sold after Ohio dismissed the
suit on statute-of-limitations grounds); see also Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 729-30
(1988) (allowing States to apply their own statutes of limitations to claims governed by the
substantive law of a different state).
29 In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)—a famous example of
venue decisions being driven by jury pool—the plaintiffs filed suit in Creek County, Oklahoma, a
blue-collar area known for large tort awards. See Juenger, supra note 26, at 560. The defendants
then removed the case to federal court to secure the more “straight-laced” jurors in Tulsa, but
ultimately the Supreme Court held that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction, so the venue game was for
naught. Id.
30 See id. at 560-62 (discussing a case involving an overseas plane crash litigated in federal
court in Los Angeles). Many of the same considerations that drive forum shopping in state and
federal courts influence the choice of international forum as well. Indeed, foreign jurisdictions
seem more welcoming of alien forum shopping than the U.S. Supreme Court. See id. at 564
(“Compared to the United States Supreme Court, some foreign tribunals positively welcome
forum shoppers.”).
31 See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 379 (2006) (“The
players in forum shopping include the plaintiff(s) and counsel, the defendant(s) and counsel, and
any anticipated additional participants.”).
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jurisdiction, and venue; (2) weighing the benefits and drawbacks of each
eligible forum; and (3) filing suit in the forum that yields the greatest
likelihood of a favorable outcome.32 Scholars have identified three main
factors that determine how litigants evaluate the likelihood of favorable
outcome:33 favorable substantive law,34 favorable procedural provisions,35
and favorable local considerations.36 For instance, in some cases a plaintiff
might prefer a particular venue because courts in that jurisdiction are
bound by a legal rule that favors the plaintiff ’s case, while other forums do
not follow that particular rule. In other cases, different procedural rules
(such as differing statutes of limitation) could motivate a plaintiff to file in
one forum but not another. Lastly, local considerations (such as proximity
to witnesses and the composition of the prospective jury pool) may
influence a plaintiff to prefer one forum over another.
Defendants are not completely powerless when faced with a forumshopping plaintiff. Defendants can urge the court to transfer the case to a
forum that is less favorable to the plaintiff. In modern practice, courts
typically transfer cases in one of two ways. First, the common law doctrine
of forum non conveniens permits courts to transfer cases over which they
have jurisdiction but which would pose an inequitable inconvenience to the

32 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1508 (1995) (“The plaintiff ’s opening moves include shopping for the
most favorable forum. Then, the defendant’s parries and thrusts might include some forumshopping in return, possibly by a motion for change of venue.”); see also Bassett, supra note 31, at
382 (applying rational choice theory to forum shopping and concluding that “the rational lawyer
will choose” the venue that potentially offers “a more favorable outcome”).
33 See Bassett, supra note 31, at 346, 348-50 (listing the “considerations that inform and
guide” forum decisions as choices involving (1) different substantive laws, (2) different procedural
provisions, and (3) subjective and personal factors).
34 See Nita Ghei & Francesco Parisi, Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Forum Shopping:
Conflicts Law as Spontaneous Order, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1367, 1390 (2004) (identifying
substantive law differences as an important consideration in forum shopping); Antony L. Ryan,
Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 167, 191 (2000) (“One of the most important
potential consequences of forum selection is a difference in applicable law.”).
35 Ryan, supra note 34, at 200 (“The choice of favorable substantive law is the most dramatic
prize for the successful forum-shopper, but there are also many important procedural distinctions
among courts.”).
36 Local considerations consist of a variety of factors that are unique to each court. These
factors can include judicial reputation; geographical proximity to litigants, witnesses, or counsel;
reputation of a court’s jury pool; and counsel’s familiarity with the court. See Mary Garvey
Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 80
n.2 (1999) (cataloguing the potential motives for forum shopping); Bassett, supra note 31, at 350-51
(listing the factors involved in choosing venue); Juenger, supra note 26, at 573-74 (noting
considerations of “the forum’s reputation for fairness (or pro-plaintiff bias), the efficacy and speed
of judicial proceedings, the quality of available counsel, and . . . the ‘legal climate’”).
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courts or parties.37 This doctrine is most often invoked in cases involving
foreign defendants.38 Alternatively, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) permits courts to
transfer a civil action to another district “[f]or the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice.”39 Second, defendants have the
option of filing a motion to dismiss for improper venue.40 Kevin Clermont
and Theodore Eisenberg summarize the venue game as follows: “The
plaintiff ’s opening moves include shopping for the most favorable forum.
Then, the defendant’s parries and thrusts might include some forumshopping in return, possibly by a motion for change of venue. Venue is
worth fighting over because outcome often turns on forum.”41 Clermont
and Eisenberg’s empirical work validates their claim regarding the
importance of venue. They found that plaintiffs win 58% of civil cases that
remain in the plaintiff ’s selected forum.42 On the other hand, in cases that
are transferred to the defendant’s preferred venue, the plaintiff wins only
29% of the time.43 The frequency and intensity with which parties litigate
venue only serves to reinforce the point.
Nearly everything written about forum shopping—whether from a
judicial, academic, or practitioner perspective—involves some iteration of
the familiar moves described above. Therefore, it is not surprising that
courts have been overlooked as players in the forum shopping game because
many of the factors thought to influence forum shopping (e.g., substantive
law, procedural rules, and local considerations) are outside the control of
any particular judge or court. For instance, the doctrine of stare decisis
prevents a trial judge from altering the law by which he or she is bound to
attract litigants.44 Similarly, a judge is powerless to place his or her court in
proximity to witnesses or to alter the characteristics of the local jury pool.

37 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947) (proposing a balancing test for
courts to use when deciding whether to dismiss a claim under the doctrine); Edward L. Barrett,
Jr., The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 380, 389-90 (1947) (examining the
constitutional limitations on the application of the doctrine in the United States).
38 See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430 (2007).
39 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
40 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3).
41 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 1508.
42 Id. at 1511-12.
43 Id. at 1512.
44 See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 723, 725-29 (1988) (examining theories of stare decisis and the broader context of their
evolution).
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Traditional scholarship has also assumed that courts are disinterested in
impacting venue decisions.45 If a court increases its appeal to litigants, the
workload of that court increases with no corresponding increase in
compensation. The work of a judge is stressful enough without
unnecessarily seeking out more work. Thus, courts are portrayed in the
literature as “passive” institutions lacking both the incentive and the ability
to influence litigants’ venue preferences.46
II. COURT COMPETITION
Unlike many forum shopping plaintiffs, patent litigants cannot, in
general, shop for favorable substantive law. Patent cases in all U.S. district
courts are governed by the law of the Federal Circuit, not the circuit where
the district resides.47 Furthermore, patent litigants are bound by the same
set of procedural rules—the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.48

45 See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody
Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 11 (1993) (characterizing some judges as pursuers of
“leisure”).
46 See WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIONALIZING JUSTICE: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 26 (1990) (“Courts are relatively passive
organizations within a demanding environment . . . .”); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE
LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE 191 (1975) (“Courts in our tradition are
passive; they sit waiting for cases. They do not call them up on their own . . . .”). See generally
Donald J. Black, The Mobilization of Law, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 125 (1973) (arguing that litigants
shape the law’s application and interpretation by initiating and defending cases).
47 Patent cases are governed by the substantive law of the Federal Circuit. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295(a)(1) (2012) (granting the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under
federal patent law). In limited circumstances (such as cases with patent law raised solely as a
counterclaim), cases with patent issues fall outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit. See, e.g.,
Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002) (“Not all cases
involving a patent-law claim fall within the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction.”). But even those cases
tend to be decided by looking to the law of the Federal Circuit. See Christopher A. Cotropia,
“Arising Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity in Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
253, 309-10 (2003) (arguing that regional circuits should look to Federal Circuit law for patent
issues even where the Federal Circuit does not have jurisdiction).
48 While intracircuit procedural nuances still exist, the Federal Circuit has held that
procedural rules on “patent-related” matters are governed by Federal Circuit law, while procedural
rules pertaining to nonpatent issues are governed by circuit law. Panduit Corp. v. All States
Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574-75 & n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1984). For a critique of this rule, see
Ted L. Field, Improving the Federal Circuit’s Approach to Choice of Law for Procedural Matters in
Patent Cases, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 643, 685 (2009), where the author argues that the Federal
Circuit “has inconsistently articulated its choice-of-law rules for procedural issues in patent cases”
and applied them inconsistently. In addition to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, many
district courts have adopted their own procedural rules for patent cases, an issue I address in
depth in subsection II.B.2.a.
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There are, to be sure, a number of formal procedural differences
between district courts. Almost all federal district courts have adopted
additional “local” rules that supplement the Federal Rules. An increasing
number of courts have even adopted special “patent local rules” that only
apply in patent cases.49 But as further discussed in subsection II.B.2.a, infra,
these differences between local rules are more likely to serve as signals of
court competition for patent cases than as driving forces behind litigants’
choice of forum. Scholars of the patent system have identified a host of
court factors that entice litigants to file patent cases in particular courts.50
These characteristics include time to trial, likelihood of getting to trial, and
average damage awards.
Despite legal scholars’ inattention to the role of courts in forum
shopping,51 courts have engaged in competition for litigants in various legal
areas. Properly understood, forum shopping in patent law is partly the
result of this competition for litigants.
The theory of court competition complicates the traditional notion of
forum shopping.52 Instead of a single-step game played between the
plaintiff and defendant, court competition theory involves a two-step
model. First courts compete (if they choose to do so); then plaintiffs and
defendants engage in forum shopping.
In the first stage—court competition—courts establish procedural rules,
administrative procedures, and informal norms of case management in their
courtrooms.53 If those established procedures are predictable and favorable
to the party selecting the forum, they may attract litigants to file in that
particular forum. To the extent they are unpredictable or unfavorable to the
party selecting the forum, they may dissuade litigants from filing there. Of

49 See generally La Belle, supra note 10 (manuscript at 15-21) (explaining the “special” rules of
procedure that the Federal Circuit and lower Federal Courts have developed for patent cases).
50 See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of
Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 805 (2008)
(analyzing suggestions to decrease forum shopping for a host of different factors by improving
appellate decisionmaking in patent cases and using specialized courts).
51 A few scholars have broken with the traditional narrative of courts as neutral players in the
venue game. For example, Friedrich Juenger has written about courts influencing venue decisions
in international law, although he has not focused attention on courts competing with other courts
within the same country. See Juenger, supra note 26, at 564-70 (describing how many foreign
countries openly flaunt their litigation-friendly rules to attract “alien” plaintiffs). Similarly, Lynn
LoPucki has detailed the manner in which bankruptcy courts and judges have engaged in
competition for litigants. See generally LOPUCKI, supra note 17.
52 See generally LOPUCKI, supra note 17, at 137 (distinguishing “court competition” from
“forum shopping”).
53 See infra subsection II.B.2.
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course, most trial management procedures are not designed to influence
litigants’ choice of forum. Judges are, in most cases, largely indifferent to
the types of cases filed in their courts and simply handle the cases assigned
to them in the most efficient manner possible. However, in certain
instances, a court might desire to have some influence over the nature of its
docket. It is in those instances that court competition becomes relevant.
Even if a forum maintains administrative norms that appeal to
plaintiffs, the court must find some method of communicating those norms.
Courts can signal their interest in certain types of cases in various ways.
First, the court can codify certain practices into local procedural rules.
Second, word-of-mouth can convey the court’s interest to other litigants.
Practitioner publications are filled with suggestions of courts that are ideal
for certain types of cases. Lastly, judges and courts can explicitly announce
their interest in certain types of cases. While this last signaling method
may seem unlikely, it is increasingly common in modern patent litigation
practice.54
Forum shopping plaintiffs or defendants then battle over forum in an
attempt to secure the court with the most favorable set of legal rules,
procedural rules, and administrative norms. First, the plaintiff selects the
most favorable forum in which the jurisdictional requirements are met. In
response, the defendant has three options: (a) acquiesce to the plaintiff ’s
choice of venue, (b) move to transfer the case to another venue that is more
favorable to the defendant, or (c) bring a motion for forum non conveniens.
In some cases, the defendant can preempt the venue choice of the plaintiff
by filing a declaratory judgment action.55
To be clear, the model described above does not reject the previous
literature on forum shopping or the features of courts that scholars have
previously identified as important to forum-shopping litigants. Instead, the
model builds upon previous scholarship by examining where and why those
court-specific features develop in the first place. The thesis of this Article
assumes that courts are, at times, motivated by concerns outside the
traditional realms of equity and efficiency typically associated with the
judicial role. Courts can seek to attract litigants by offering services that
appeal to particular plaintiffs. Conversely, these same institutions can seek
to repel litigants by offering unappealing services. Courts can compete with
each other for litigants, and at times, they do.
54

See infra Section II.B.
See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007) (finding jurisdiction
over a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of a patent even though the patent
licensee had not breached its license).
55
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There are generally three concerns associated with forum shopping in
general and patent forum shopping in particular: non-uniformity,
inefficiency, and unfairness.56 Forum shopping creates uneven enforcement
when patent rights are more likely to be upheld in particular courts.57 The
practice is also inefficient because litigants often spend resources litigating
over venue. Furthermore, uneven enforcement of rights makes the legal
system appear unjust and arbitrary.58
Court competition heightens the three concerns generally associated
with forum shopping. First, to compete for litigants, courts must
distinguish themselves from other courts by offering more services that
appeal to one party—the party selecting venue. By offering what amounts
to plaintiff-friendly services, the odds of success are tilted in favor of
patentees in those venues. Second, court competition adds additional
inefficiencies to the judicial process. Aside from the typical venue battles
that litigants wage, courts seeking to influence venue choices make case
management decisions in an effort to attract future litigants, rather than to
handle cases efficiently. This can lead to inefficient procedural and
administrative practices. Lastly, when courts actively pursue litigants,
questions of judicial neutrality are inevitable.
To examine court competition theory in patent law, Section A of this
Part describes the history of forum shopping in patent law beginning with
the period immediately before the creation of the Federal Circuit and up to
the present day. In doing so, it studies the history of three high-volume
patent districts: the District of Delaware, the Eastern District of Virginia,
and the Eastern District of Texas. Section B suggests possible motivations
for judges and courts to engage in court competition. Then, based on the
case study of the three district courts, it discusses ways in which courts
compete for litigants.

56 See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 9, at 1464-65 (describing the underlying flaws of forum
shopping).
57 Id.; see also Moore, supra note 5, at 920-21, 921 fig.4 (discussing the effects of forum
shopping on the outcome of the case).
58 Moore, supra note 5, at 924 (“This instability erodes public confidence in the law and its
enforcement and creates doubt about the fairness of the system.”).
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A. The Rise of Court Competition in Patent Litigation
1. Shopping for a Circuit Court: 1970–1982
Before 1970, patent litigation was a highly specialized practice.59 Nearly
all patent litigation was handled by boutique law firms filled with former
employees of the United States Patent & Trademark Office (PTO).60 The
typical path to becoming a patent litigator consisted of working for a short
time at the PTO, then transitioning to a private company or law firm to
learn the nuances of patent procurement, and then advancing to the
specialized litigant class of the patent bar.61 Perhaps because of this
customary apprenticeship in patent prosecution (the term used for
procuring patents), patent litigators of the era were uncomfortable with
jury trials. Thus, the overwhelming majority of patent cases before 1970
were tried without juries.62
During the 1970s, however, seasoned litigators began entering the field
of patent litigation. The trial lawyers who ventured into the arcane world of
patent law began emphasizing the value of juries.63 Additionally, these
attorneys brought a wealth of knowledge from other legal fields, which they
quickly applied to patent cases. They introduced complex procedural
arguments into patent cases, many of which were adopted by courts.64 The
new emphasis on procedural and legal innovations, as well as the increased
59 See Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization, Litigant Influence, and Substantive Policy: The
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 823, 835 (1977) (finding that the patent
bar in 1977 was a “group of four thousand lawyers constitut[ing] a particularly distinct
specialization within the legal profession”); cf. Ralph E. Harper, Commentaria, An Open Letter to
the Patent Bar, 56 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 189, 190 (1974) (referring to a subset of the Patent Bar
members as the “litigating bar”).
60 See Wilbur F. Pell, Jr., Patent Law Cases – A Retrospective View from a Lame Swan Appellate
Judge, 9 APLA Q.J. 105, 107 (1981) (describing the author’s experience as a lawyer at a general
practice firm whose patent practice consisted of giving inventors directions to the offices of nearby
patent firms).
61 See Craig E. Larson & Donald S. Holland, A Study of New Patent Lawyers, 9 APLA Q.J. 12,
33 (1981) (“At the beginning of their practice, the majority of all new lawyers spend virtually all of
their time on patent procurement.”); Robert D. Yeager, The Patent Profession: A Time to Go Public
For New Lawyers, 9 APLA Q.J. 60, 63-64 (1981) (describing professional paths and career
progressions for patent attorneys).
62 See J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and
Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 18-21 (2014) (discussing the
rise of jury trials beginning in the mid-1970s).
63 See id. at 19-20 (explaining litigators’ many reasons for favoring juries and the success of
this strategy).
64 The Sixth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
84 F.R.D. 429, 440-43 (1979) (lamenting the burdensome nature of patent litigation in district
courts, especially abuses of the discovery process).
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importance of juries, led to an explosion of forum shopping in patent
cases.65
When patent lawyers went in search of the ideal forum in the 1970s,
they were shopping for circuits that were “pro-patent.”66 Regional
variations in substantive patent law determined whether a circuit court was
characterized as pro- or anti-patent.67 Some circuits imposed high standards
of proof to uphold the validity of a patent, while others did not.68 Some
circuits made it difficult for declaratory judgment plaintiffs to establish
standing, while others did not.69 And some circuits were simply skeptical of
the value of the patent system generally, while others found it beneficial.70
Patent holders tended to prefer to file their cases in a district court
within the Fifth, Sixth, or Seventh Circuit because various holdings from
those circuits improved a patentee’s odds of success.71 Defendants
commonly filed motions to transfer.72 Defendants usually preferred to
litigate in the Eighth or Ninth Circuit, where case law was less favorable
towards patentees.73 Motions to dismiss were litigated with vigor.74
Empirical evidence validates these anecdotes: the odds of having a patent

65 See generally Scott E. Atkinson et al., The Economics of a Centralized Judiciary: Uniformity,
Forum Shopping, and the Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 411 (2009) (empirically demonstrating
that forum shopping on the basis of patent validity rates was widespread but ceased in the late
1970s).
66 See id. at 415 (noting various courts of appeals that were known to rule in favor of
patentees more often than other courts).
67 See Howard T. Markey, The Phoenix Court, 10 APLA Q.J. 227, 232-34 (1982) (explaining the
numerous differences among courts in the tests, standards, and practices employed in patent
cases).
68 See id. at 233 (describing the differing obviousness standards for design patents among the
various circuit courts).
69 See id. at 232 (describing the divergent practices among circuit courts regarding whether
the licensee had to terminate the license to challenge the validity of a patent in a declaratory
judgment action).
70 See Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 6-7 (explaining the overall skepticism toward the patent
system and the differing burdens various courts placed on patentees and alleged infringers).
71 Id. at 7; Robert L. Harmon, Seven New Rules of Thumb: How the Federal Circuit Has
Changed the Way Patent Lawyers Advise Clients, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 573, 573-74 (1992).
72 Consider Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1960), in which an accused infringer was
ultimately denied transfer from the Fifth Circuit to the Seventh Circuit but not before litigating
the transfer motion in both circuits and the Supreme Court.
73 Harmon, supra note 71, at 574 (“When this author broke into the business, and for many
years thereafter, it was quite clear that there was no such thing as a valid patent in the Eighth
Circuit, and the climate in the Ninth Circuit was not much more hospitable.”).
74 See supra note 72.
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found to be valid could differ by over fifty percent, depending on the circuit
court that ultimately reviewed the case.75
Many patent lawyers were troubled by the substantial differences
between circuits in the handling of patent cases. In 1972, Congress
established the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate
System (better known as the “Hruska Commission”) to explore ways to
control the increasing number of cases filed in the federal courts.76 Patent
reform advocates saw the Hruska Commission as an ideal opportunity to
push for a solution to the divergent approaches to patent validity among
the various circuits.77 The Hruska Commission was inundated with
complaints about forum shopping generally and the problem with patent
forum shopping in particular. Professor James Gambrell and well-known
patent attorney Donald Dunner testified before the Commission about
their survey of patent attorneys. Gambrell and Dunner’s findings confirm
the common perception of patent attorneys of this era: forum shopping was
“extensive” and “directly attributable” to the differences in application and
interpretation of the patent statute among the various numbered circuit
courts.78 According to Gambrell and Dunner, “patent owners and alleged
infringers spend inordinate amounts of time, effort and money jockeying
for a post position in the right court for the right issues. Nowhere is the
quest more vigorously pursued than for the right forum to rule on
validity.”79
In response, the Hruska Commission recommended that a national
appeals court be established to address some, but not all, patent cases.80
Under the Commission’s proposal, typical patent cases would have
75 See Atkinson et al., supra note 65, at 433 (“[A]ll else constant, a switch from the Third
Circuit to the Tenth Circuit in the pre-[Federal Circuit] era results in an increased likelihood of
patent validity of 0.52.”).
76 See generally Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal
Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 218-19 (1975) (“The question, however, is
whether, in light of the other demands placed upon the [Supreme] Court, and considering the
interests of the system as a whole, some issues might better be decided by another tribunal
empowered to hand down precedents of national effect.”).
77 F. M. Scherer, The Political Economy of Patent Policy Reform in the United States, 7 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 167, 188 (2009) (describing how the majority of respondents
approved a “proposal calling for a new centralized appellate court . . . [that] was circulated in July
1978 to [anyone] likely to have any significant interest in the subject” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 50, at 788 (“It was thought that if patent appeals were
channeled to a single court, . . . the quality of decisions in patent disputes would improve.”).
78 Comm’n on Revision of the Fed. Court Appellate Sys., Structure and Internal Procedure:
Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 369-70 (1975).
79 Id. at 370.
80 Id. at 371.
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continued to be litigated in the numbered circuit courts of appeal. But, if a
particularly difficult question of patent law arose, the case could be
transferred to the newly established court.81 The Commission rejected
proposals to create an appeals court that would handle all patent matters.82
Two years after the Hruska Commission’s recommendations, Congress
passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (FCIA).83 Breaking
with the Hruska Commission’s recommended solution, the FCIA created
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and gave the
court exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals arising under the patent laws.84
Congress’s motivation to create the Federal Circuit stemmed in large part
from a desire to eliminate regional differences in patent enforcement that
were driving forum shopping in patent litigation. By centralizing patent
appeals in one circuit, Congress hoped to harmonize patent law across the
United States and eliminate forum shopping in patent litigation.85
2. Shopping for a District Court: 1982–2013
By and large, the creation of the Federal Circuit has succeeded in
creating a uniform, national patent law.86 Although the court has been
criticized for being “pro-patent” and overly formalistic (among other
things), centralizing all appeals in one court has eliminated regional
variations in substantive law.87 Because all patent appeals now are heard at
the Federal Circuit, patent holders, at least in theory, can no longer forum
shop for advantageous substantive law.
Despite the Federal Circuit’s oversight and control of patent law, forum
shopping persists.88 Over six-thousand patent cases are filed annually in the
United States,89 but those cases are not evenly distributed among the
81

Id.
See generally Scherer, supra note 77, at 187-88 (discussing the Commission’s rejection of a
specialized court to hear all patent appeals).
83 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
84 Id.
85 See Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 2-3 (discussing the efficiency and administrative reasons
weighing in favor of the creation of the Federal Circuit).
86 Id. at 74 (“On the whole, the CAFC experiment has worked well for patent law, which is
now more uniform, easier to apply, and more responsive to national interests.”).
87 See generally id. at 64-65 (discussing the success of the Federal Circuit and proposing ways
to increase its efficiency).
88 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 5, at 901-07 (conducting an empirical analysis of patent forum
shopping).
89 Projections indicate a total of 6134 patent cases will be filed in the United States in the
year 2013. Press Release, Perkins Coie, supra note 1.
82
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ninety-four U.S. federal district courts. Nearly half of all cases are filed in
the top two districts (Delaware and Eastern Texas) and seventy-five percent
are adjudicated in the top ten districts.90 Geographical considerations do
not explain the concentration of patent cases.91
Scholars have empirically examined the problem in an attempt to
decipher precisely what drives forum shopping in patent law. Thenprofessor Kimberly Moore—who is now a Federal Circuit judge—
conducted the first empirical analysis of forum shopping in patent cases
filed after the creation of the Federal Circuit.92 Moore found that the
cluster of patent cases filed in certain districts could not be explained fully
by the concentration of innovation in those districts.93 Moore also found
that the party that initially files suit (i.e., a patentee in an infringement
action or an accused infringer in a declaratory judgment action) was a
significant predictor of validity, enforceability, and infringement.94 “The
most likely explanation” for this result, Moore concludes, “is that forum
and timing really do matter.”95
Moore hypothesized that a number of differences among district courts
could explain the forum shopping phenomenon. She found that the top
districts tended to be those with speedier dockets, greater likelihood of
settlement before trial, or higher patentee win rates.96 However, Moore
admitted that none of these traditional characteristics could explain the
stratification of patent cases.97 As a solution to the forum shopping
problem, Moore proposed either the creation of a specialized patent district
court98 or modification of the patent venue statute.99

90

See id. (summarizing 2013 patent case concentration).
See Fromer, supra note 9, at 1453-54 (positing that courts’ generous interpretation of the
venue statutes makes geography irrelevant in patent cases). Xuan-Thao Nguyen argues that the
Eastern District’s high concentration of patent cases is consistent with the large numbers of
patentees who reside in Texas. Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice Scalia’s “Renegade Jurisdiction”: Lessons
for Patent Law Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV. 111, 134-35 (2008). But the fact that Texas has a large
number of patentees does not explain why so many patentees file suit in the Eastern District of
Texas rather than in the Northern, Southern, or Western Districts, all of which have larger
populations, more technologically-based companies, and, presumably, more patentees.
92 Moore, supra note 5, at 892.
93 Id. at 904-07.
94 Id. at 921.
95 Id. at 921-22.
96 Id. at 907-18.
97 Id. at 919 (“Th[e] variation suggests that there may be no single explanation of patent
holders’ selection of particular jurisdictions.”).
98 Id. at 932-34.
99 Id. at 934-37.
91
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Mark Lemley has found that patent forum shopping has increased since
Moore’s study.100 Lemley’s study assumes patent litigants are seeking the
traditional benefits of forum shopping: the best mixture of speed,
likelihood of getting to trial, and win-rate.101 However, like Moore, Lemley
admits that those characteristics cannot explain the clustering that occurs in
patent litigation. For example, according to Lemley’s theory, patent filings
should not be clustered in the Eastern District of Texas.102 Instead,
Lemley’s metrics indicate that the Middle District of Florida, a rather
unpopular forum with patent litigants, should be receiving more patent
cases than Texas.103
To shed light on why certain districts receive the bulk of patent cases,
this Section will examine the forum shopping experience of three district
courts: the Eastern District of Texas, the District of Delaware, and the
Eastern District of Virginia.
a. Eastern District of Texas
Over the past decade, the district that has received the most attention—
some might say notoriety—for its patent litigation docket has been the
Eastern District of Texas. A mere afterthought for patent plaintiffs in 2000,
the Eastern District had eclipsed all other districts for patent filings by
2008.104 Today, over twenty-one percent of all patent cases are filed there.105
The rise of the Eastern District of Texas as the premier patent forum is a
complex and controversial story. Regardless of what one thinks of the
merits of the district as a patent forum, however, it is nearly universally
accepted that the district’s preeminent place in patent litigation today is
largely due to the efforts of one man: Judge T. John Ward.106
100 See generally Lemley, supra note 2 (discussing the most advantageous forums in which to
file patent suits).
101 Id. at 402-03.
102 Id. at 410 (pointing out that the Eastern District of Texas is not even among the top five
districts in terms of patent win-rates).
103 Id. at 421 (“The best aggregate patent district for plaintiffs is, surprisingly, the Middle
District of Florida.”).
104 Elizabeth P. Offen-Brown, Note, Forum Shopping and Venue Transfer in Patent Cases:
Marshall’s Response to TS Tech and Genentech, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 61, 70 & tbl.1 (2010)
(depicting the Eastern District of Texas’s “drastic increase in patent filings”).
105 See Press Release, Perkins Coie, supra note 1.
106 See, e.g., Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the
Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J. L.
& TECH. 193, 207 (2007) (discussing Judge Ward’s influence on the district); Michael C. Smith,
Rocket Docket: Marshall Court Leads Nation in Hearing Patent Cases, 69 TEX. BAR J. 1045, 1048
(2006) (listing Judge Ward’s efforts to welcome patent cases in his district). But see Nguyen, supra
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Prior to Ward’s arrival on the bench, the Eastern District heard few
patent cases. The district had long been known as a plaintiff-friendly
district, often attracting class action personal injury suits.107 Plaintiff firms
were attracted to the district due to the unique attributes of the local jury
pool.108 Judge Ward was appointed to the bench in the Eastern District in
1999. Almost immediately he set out to attract patent litigants to his
district.109
Two years after Ward was appointed to the court, he adopted a set of
additional procedural rules for patent cases modeled on the Northern
District of California’s rules.110 Ward’s rules had a few plaintiff-friendly
elements that the Northern District of California’s rules lacked.111 For
example, while the Northern District established an eighteen-month
discovery period, Ward’s rules permitted only nine months.112 Furthermore,
Ward’s rules provided defendants little ability to alter the discovery
deadlines or trial dates, allowing plaintiffs to impose a strict timeline on
often overwhelmed defendants.113 The entire Eastern District adopted
Ward’s rules in 2005.114
note 91, at 123 (stating that Richard Agnich, the former general counsel for Texas Instruments, is
“generally credited for the creation of the EDTX as the patent trial court”).
107 See Ronen Avraham & John M. Golden, From PI to IP: Yet Another Unexpected Effect of
Tort Reform 15-18 (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, Law and Econ., Research Paper No. 211, 2012),
available at http://web.stanford.edu/dept/law/ipsc/Paper%20PDF/Golden,%20John%20-%20Paper.pdf
(finding that tort reform led to an increase in patent filings in Texas possibly due to greater
“space” in courts’ dockets to hear IP cases).
108 See Dick Dahl, IP Plaintiffs Flocking to Small Town in Eastern Texas, ST. LOUIS DAILY
REC., June 6, 2006 (describing the benefits accruing to plaintiffs from the “uneducated” local jury
pool that favors property rights); see also Nguyen, supra note 91, at 122-24 (describing how other
companies followed the lead of Texas Instruments in deciding to bring large patent suits in the
Eastern District of Texas to take advantage of the court’s “speediness”).
109 See Allen Pusey, Marshall Law: Patent Lawyers Flock to East Texas Court for Its Expertise and
‘Rocket Docket,’ DALL. MORNING NEWS, Mar. 26, 2006, at 1D (describing how the city of
Marshall, Texas began to attract more patent litigation).
110 James Ware & Brian Davy, The History, Content, Application and Influence of the Northern
District of California’s Patent Local Rules, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 965,
1011 (2009).
111 See Alfonso Garcia Chan, Proposed Patent Local Rules for Adoption by Texas’ Federal District
Courts, 7 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 149, 151 (2003) (comparing Judge Ward’s local rules
with the Northern District of California’s rules); Alisha Kay Taylor, What Does Forum Shopping in
the Eastern District of Texas Mean for Patent Reform?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. OF INTELL. PROP. L.
570, 572-73 (2007) (describing the unique Eastern District of Texas local rules, including the
mandate requiring defendants to compile all information used to invalidate the plaintiff ’s claims
before trial).
112 Leychkis, supra note 106, at 209.
113 Id.
114 See E.D. TEX. PAT. R. 1-3.
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The new rules brought predictability and uniformity to the district’s
case management practices. In addition, the Eastern District’s rules resulted
in litigants getting to trial twice as quickly as litigants in the Northern
District of California.115 The speed and predictability of litigation in the
Eastern District led to an explosion in patent filings. The district’s caseload
grew from fourteen patent filings in 1999 to fifty-five in 2003.116
Patent plaintiffs found the district to be accommodating in many other
ways as well. For instance, the district gained a reputation for awarding
massive patent infringement damages. In 2006, for example, Z4
Technologies received a $133 million damages award against Microsoft
Corporation.117 Even more appealing to plaintiffs, no plaintiff had ever lost
a patent trial in the Eastern District until 2005: twelve trials had resulted in
twelve verdicts of valid and infringed.118 The speed, large damage awards,
outstanding win-rates, likelihood of getting to trial, and plaintiff-friendly
local rules suddenly made the Eastern District the venue of choice for
patent plaintiffs. Filings jumped to 214 in 2006.119
The Eastern District also began experimenting with its case assignment
system for patent cases. Patent-holding companies (known as patent trolls
or non-practicing entities) began to view the Eastern District as an ideal
venue for their repeat appearances.120 The cities and towns in the Eastern
District profited from the increase in patent litigation. Money from out-oftown litigation has supported the economies of Marshall and other cities in
the Eastern District.121 Indeed, Marshall has long enjoyed the economic
benefits of litigation. Prior to the rise of patent cases, the city enjoyed a
reputation as a haven for personal injury suits.122 The legal community, in
particular, has also benefited from the increased workload. Some local firms
switched from acting as local counsel in personal injury suits to providing

115 See Dahl, supra note 108 (quoting a plaintiffs’ attorney stating that his case would have
taken twice as long in California).
116 Leychkis, supra note 106, at 206 tbl.6.
117 Z4 Techs. v. Microsoft, No. 06-0142, 2006 WL 1626711, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2006).
118 See Leychkis, supra note 106, at 211-12 tbl.7 (listing the damages awarded in those cases).
119 Id. at 205 tbl.5.
120 See Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006, at
B1 (“A lot of the cases being filed in Marshall are by patent holding companies, or patent
trolls . . . .”).
121 See Dahl, supra note 108 (noting the increase in commercial rental values and the support
of local hotels and restaurants to accommodate patent attorneys).
122 See Creswell, supra note 120 (discussing class action suits filed by Marshall lawyers against
companies that used asbestos).
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counsel to patent firms.123 The economic benefits of the patent docket have
also enabled the Eastern District to renovate its court buildings.124
In fact, the economic windfall of increased patent litigation in the small
towns of East Texas has been felt in some of the most unlikely corners.
Companies that frequently litigate in the town of Marshall, Texas—
including Tivo, Medtronic, and Opti Inc.—have helped stimulate the local
economy by purchasing prize cattle at the livestock auction during Farm
City Week in Marshall.125 Tivo purchased its steer for around $10,000,
shortly before a major trial in Marshall began.126 Festivals all over Marshall
have benefited from the deep pockets of companies coming to the town’s
courthouses. Samsung, the electronics giant, is the sponsor of most major
festivals in Marshall.127
b. District of Delaware
Perhaps the largest outlier district in terms of number of patent
litigation filings relative to the number of patent-holders in the state is the
District of Delaware. The District of Delaware has been one of the busiest
patent districts in the country for over fifteen years yet has little local
industry to speak of, few patentees within the state, and a small civil
docket.128 Despite the lack of connection to technology industries,
Delaware is the state of incorporation for the majority of America’s largest
corporations.129 Delaware’s status has given its courts a disproportionate

123 See Dahl, supra note 108 (stating that the Roth law firm switched from 75% personal
injury work to 75% intellectual property work over the course of five years); see also Avraham &
Golden, supra note 107, at 17-19 (demonstrating that tort reform led to a rise in patent cases in the
Eastern District of Texas).
124 Nguyen, supra note 91, at 142 n.153 (“[T]he century-old Harrison County Courthouse in
the Marshall division has been renovated and updated to handle the expanding patent docket.”).
125 See, e.g., Zusha Elinson, IP Trial Strategy: Buying Tivo’s Bull, RECORDER ( June 26, 2009),
http://www.therecorder.com/id=1202431746710, archived at http://perma.cc/5NMX-GGZT
(demonstrating an example of an attorney’s case strategy involving the purchase of a steer at a
local livestock auction).
126 Id. (explaining that the seller, a high school senior, received $10,000 from the sale for her
college fund).
127 Id.
128 See Moore, supra note 5, at 903-05 & tbls.1 & 2 (demonstrating the relatively small patent
caseloads and number of patents granted in Delaware as compared to a sampling of other U.S.
states).
129 About Agency, STATE OF DEL., http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (last
visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/79GB-ATYL (“More than 50% of all publiclytraded companies in the United States including 64% of the Fortune 500 have chosen Delaware as
their legal home.”).
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number of opportunities to establish expertise in multiple areas of business
law, including corporate law, bankruptcy, and, more recently, patents.130
Because of Delaware’s unique ties to the business community, its courts
have been particularly interested in attracting litigation to the state.131
Delaware’s economy is largely based on its status as a business
headquarters, and the courts are largely viewed as part of that economy.132
The local bar is intimately connected with the judiciary. Attracting
litigation to the state means income from visiting attorneys. It also
increases the business for local attorneys, who are required to participate in
all proceedings before the Delaware courts.133 Furthermore, increased
workloads often lead to increased budgets for the judiciary.134
Attracting patent litigation to Delaware has not been difficult. The
judges in Delaware receive the most patent cases per capita of any district
in the country.135 Thus, the District of Delaware offers unparalleled
expertise in patent cases.
Beyond expertise, the District also offers a number of other benefits for
patent litigants who are interested in getting to trial—usually plaintiffs.
Delaware is the district in which a patent case is most likely to reach trial—
almost 12% of cases receive a trial.136 The district achieves this high trial
rate not through local patent rules, but rather through a norm shared by the
district’s judges to grant summary judgment motions rarely.137 The
infrequency of obtaining summary judgment increases costs for defendants,

130

See LOPUCKI, supra note 17, at 47-48.
See LOPUCKI, supra note 17 and accompanying text (stating that court competition is
more likely in specialized legal fields than nonspecialized fields).
132 Delaware has also competed for securities class action cases. See John Armour, Bernard
Black & Brian Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 647
(2012) (describing Delaware’s attempt and failure to attract more securities class action cases). But
see Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 942, 963 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(upholding a forum selection clause in a Delaware corporation’s bylaws requiring plaintiffs to file
in Delaware).
133 D. DEL. R. 83.5(d); BANKR. D. DEL. R. 9010-1(c).
134 See infra subsection II.B.1.b (indicating that increased caseloads can lead to additional
judgeships which then lock in higher budgetary outlays).
135 See Donald F. Parsons, Jr. et al., Solving the Mystery of Patentees’ “Collective Enthusiasm” for
Delaware, 7 DEL. L. REV. 145, 150 tbl.2 (2004) (illustrating the high rate at which patent cases are
filed per judge in Delaware relative to other states).
136 Lemley, supra note 2, at 411 tbl.4.
137 See id. at 403 (arguing that jurisdictions that deny summary judgment motions are more
patent-friendly).
131
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increases the odds of getting to trial, and incentivizes defendants to settle
out of fear of potentially large damage awards.138
Maintaining informal norms regarding summary judgment and trial
practices can be difficult for a court. Individual judges may have
preferences that differ from the court as a whole. But with only four judges,
Delaware’s small size permits the district to settle on shared norms more
easily than would be possible in a larger district.
c. Eastern District of Virginia
The Eastern District of Virginia possesses a number of attributes that
are appealing to plaintiffs. Most noticeably, since 1997 the district has had
the fastest average case time for its civil docket of any district court in the
country.139 Patent cases reach resolution, on average, in less than eight
months and those that go to trial usually do so in less than a year.140 But
speed is not the only advantage for patent plaintiffs in the so-called “rocket
docket”:141 the district has many experienced patent jurists, is home to the
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, chooses from a jury pool with a large
number of scientifically trained individuals, and awards relatively high
damages on average when a patent is found to be infringed.142
The Eastern District of Virginia’s reputation as a forum for speedy
justice began long before patent litigation was a major component of
federal civil dockets. In the 1950s, Judge Bryan of the Eastern District
decided that he would speed up the trial process in his courtroom. The
desire for speedy execution of justice would eventually pervade the entire

138 See Timothy B. Lee, Courts in Two States Are Tilting the Nation’s Patent System Toward
Plaintiffs, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/
2013/09/19/courts-in-two-states-are-tilting-the-nations-patent-system-toward-plaintiffs, archived at
http://perma.cc/U3EN-SEYV (“[J]udges in Delaware are relatively slow to rule on summary
judgment motions. That raises the cost of litigation for defendants, giving plaintiffs more leverage
in settlement negotiations.”).
139 Jerry Markon, A Double Dose of Molasses in the Rocket Docket, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2004,
at C4.
140 Lemley, supra note 2, at 414 tbl.5, 416 tbl.6 (indicating the average time to resolution and
time to trial for selected U.S. district courts including averages for the Eastern District of
Virginia of 0.64 and 0.96 years, respectively).
141 See, e.g., Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Reconceiving the Patent Rocket Docket: An Empirical Study of
Infringement Litigation 1985–2010, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 58, 61-63 (2011)
(suggesting that the district’s strict enforcement of early deadlines and “effective, judge-driven
settlement program” earned the Eastern District of Virginia its “rocket-docket” reputation).
142 Id. at 60-64, 69.
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culture of the court.143 To this day, the court prides itself on being one of
the fastest courts in the country. The court achieves its current speed by
imposing a heavy-handed case management style early in the trial process
and strictly enforcing a tight trial schedule.144
Patent litigants did not fully appreciate the benefits of litigating in the
Eastern District of Virginia until the late 1990s.145 Once patent litigators
fully appreciated the advantage of the “rocket docket,” however, the district
experienced an explosion of patent filings, receiving over sixty per
month.146 But the increased number of patent filings was not entirely
welcomed by the judges of the district. Because patent cases are complex
and technical, the district found that it was unable to maintain its quick
pace while wading through hundreds of patent cases.147
In response, the district made two subtle changes to its administrative
practices that were designed to dissuade patent litigants from using their
courts.148 First, the judges on the court began to transfer cases out of the
district at a much higher rate.149 In the mid-1990s, it was considered rare for
the Eastern District of Virginia to transfer cases out of its district,150 but the
143 See T.S. Ellis, III, Quicker and Less Expensive Enforcement of Patents: United States
Courts, Presentation at the Proceedings of the 1999 Summit Conference on Intellectual Property
(1999), in 5 CASRIP PUBLICATION SERIES: STREAMLINING INT’L INTELL. PROP. 11, 14 (2000)
(“[The rocket docket] has been in effect since the 1950s, largely as the result of the efforts of Judge
Albert Bryan . . . .”); see also Heather Russell Koenig, The Eastern District of Virginia: A Working
Solution for Civil Justice Reform, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 799, 802 (1998) (“The local rules for the
entire Eastern District of Virginia were structured to eliminate docket delay and expedite the
sometimes burdensome litigation process . . . .”).
144 See Vishnubhakat, supra note 141, at 61-63; see also Dabney J. Carr, IV & Robert A. Angle,
Litigating Patent Infringement Cases in the “Rocket Docket” of the Eastern District of Virginia, 22
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 14, 14 (2010) (noting that the Eastern District of Virginia’s local
rules outline a short timeline for each stage of trial).
145 See Dana D. McDaniel, Patent Litigation on the Rocket Docket After Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., VA. LAW., Apr. 2002, at 20, 20 (describing the explosion of patent filings in the
late 1990s).
146 See infra note 156 and accompanying text (noting the Eastern District of Virginia’s high
monthly rate of patent filings).
147 See Lloyd Smith, An Interview with Judge Gerald Bruce Lee, United States District Court,
Eastern District of Virginia, LANDSLIDE, Nov.–Dec. 2013, at 7, 9 (finding patent cases
“[a]bsolutely” more complex and time-consuming).
148 See William P. DiSalvatore, Filing Considerations in Patent Litigation, in PATENT
LITIGATION 81, 92-95 (2001) (discussing the Eastern District of Virginia’s efforts to reduce its
attractiveness as a forum for patent litigation by various means, including increased venue
transfer).
149 See id. (noting that the courts have been less willing to defer to the plaintiff ’s choice of
forum).
150 See Thomas W. Winland, A Whirlwind Ride on the Rocket Docket, FINNEGAN (1995),
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=73ea67c4-61cb-47fd-9252-
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Eastern District soon began transferring a large number of patent cases to
other venues.151 Judge Lee of the Eastern District has stated that “if we did
not properly examine the venue, then we would be overwhelmed with every
single patent case that involved a device that was sold at Tyson’s Corner
Mall,” a popular mall in a suburb of Washington, D.C..152
The second change that the Eastern District made to dissuade patent
filers was an alteration of the judge assignment procedure for patent cases.
The Eastern District of Virginia has three divisions: Alexandria, Norfolk,
and Richmond.153 Before 2002, civil litigants were randomly assigned to a
judge within the district in which the case was filed.154 Most patent
plaintiffs preferred to file in the Alexandria division due to its proximity to
the PTO and Washington D.C. law firms, its predictable trial management
of patent cases, and its experience in handling patent cases.155 But in 2002,
the Alexandria division was receiving up to sixty patent case filings per
month, a number that made it impossible for the court to maintain its
speedy reputation.156
To reduce the flood of patent litigants, the Eastern District changed its
case assignment procedures.157 The new assignment procedure stipulated
that patent cases (and only patent cases) that were filed in the Alexandria

05d316ad34f4, archived at http://perma.cc/C5Q5-H7GT (noting that even when another venue is
available, “rarely is a defendant able to successfully avoid the whirlwind ride on the Rocket
Docket”).
151 See Moore, supra note 5, at 915 (highlighting the Eastern District of Virginia’s increased
willingness to transfer patent cases).
152 Smith, supra note 147, at 9.
153 Carr & Angle, supra note 144, at 14.
154 See Dabney J. Carr, IV & Robert A. Angle, Traps for the Unwary: Litigating Intellectual
Property Cases in the Rocket Docket, 11 MEALEY’S LITIGATION REPORT: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, Apr. 7, 2003, at 1, 7 n.3 (“Previously, the Alexandria division did not assign cases to
particular judges until trial. For hearings or proceedings prior to trial, parties were assigned
randomly to any of the judges in the division.”).
155 See id. at 1-2 (discussing some of the advantages of filing in Alexandria). The Alexandria
division has a reserved day for nondispositive motions hearings, whereas the Norfolk and
Richmond divisions do not. Id. at 5. In the Alexandria division, unlike in the Richmond division,
discovery and nondispositive motions are heard by magistrates. Id. And in the Alexandria and
Richmond divisions, unlike in the Norfolk division, at least one judge is always available to rule
on emergency motions. Id. at 4.
156 Timothy S. Ellis, III, Remarks at the Seventh National Advanced Forum on Litigation
Patent Disputes (Feb. 5, 2001), cited in McDaniel, supra note 145, at 23 n.1.
157 Carr & Angle, supra note 144, at 18 n.1 (describing the assignment procedure which
randomly assigns cases among the speedy Alexandria docket as well as Norfolk and Richmond);
see also Smith, supra note 147, at 9 (“One of the reasons we decided as a court to randomly assign
patent cases is because we realized we were being overwhelmed here in Alexandria . . . . We
decided to spread the cases around and it has helped us greatly.”).
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division were to be randomly reassigned among the judges of all three
divisions.158 Under the new rules, a litigant expecting to try his patent case
before the experienced judges in Alexandria might find himself litigating
before a less-experienced patent jurist in Norfolk or Richmond.
The changes achieved the Eastern District’s goals of reducing patent
filings.159 As a result, the “rocket docket,” with its unpredictable judgeassignment procedure and its willingness to transfer patent cases to other
district courts, has not attracted patent cases at nearly the same rate as the
District of Delaware or the Eastern District of Texas.160
B. Court Competition in Patent Litigation
Some district judges have become increasingly open about their desire
to see more patent cases come to their courtrooms. Prior to his nomination
to the bench, Judge Ward of the Eastern District of Texas had almost no
patent experience to speak of—he litigated a single patent case while in
private practice.161 But upon becoming a judge, Ward decided that he would
seek out patent litigants. Judge Ward stated, “I enjoyed the intellectual
challenge [of the patent case], so when I came to the bench, I sought out
patent cases.”162
More recently, judges in other districts have echoed Judge Ward’s desire
to increase patent litigation filings in their districts. For instance, Judge
Conti of the Western District of Pennsylvania has noted that her district
“ha[s] been trying to be a good forum for patent cases.”163 Judge Lancaster,
also in the Western District of Pennsylvania, has expressed hope that the
Patent Pilot Program “will continue to attract more out-of-state [patent]
cases to the area.”164

158

See Carr & Angle, supra note 154, at 2.
See Smith, supra note 147, at 9 (indicating that the random assignment system has served
its purpose in reducing Alexandria’s patent docket).
160 See Roderick R. McKelvie, Forum Selection in Patent Litigation: A Traffic Report, 19 INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 1 (2007) (summarizing patent case filings to show that the Eastern District
of Virginia “continues to lag behind other districts in attracting patent cases”).
161 Pusey, supra note 109.
162 Id.
163 Katie Angliss, Patent Law in Pittsburgh: Perspectives from the Bench, 11 PITTSBURGH J.
TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 3 (2011).
164 Molly Hensley-Clancy, U.S. District Court of Western Pennsylvania Attracts Patent Cases,
PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE ( July 23, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/business/
legal/2012/07/23/U-S-District-Court-of-Western-Pennsylvania-attracts-patent-cases, archived at
http://perma.cc/JM3G-2CAL.
159
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Other district courts in Texas are attempting to emulate the Eastern
District’s success in steering patent litigants to its courtrooms. In a recent
interview, Judge Barbara Lynn of the Northern District of Texas was
“frankly a little bit disappointed” that patent filings in her district had
increased only “slightly” since participating in the Patent Pilot Program.165
“I hope we’ll get more patent cases than we have right now,” she said.166
Further, Judge Lynn hoped that her district could “be considered a real
alternative to the Eastern District [of Texas]” because her district had “the
interest and the capacity” to handle additional patent cases.167 Another
judge in the Northern District has publically invited members of the patent
bar to file cases in the district.168 The Southern District of Texas has also
enacted reforms aimed at improving efficiency and attracting litigants.169
Roderick McKelvie, a former judge from the District of Delaware has
commented on the competition for patent cases. According to him, some
district courts have “hung out a welcome sign for patent cases by expressing
interest in the cases, forming advisory committees, or adopting local
rules.”170
But not all judges who are interested in influencing venue decisions are
attempting to attract litigants—indeed some are interested in dissuading
patent litigants from filing in their courts. The Western District of
Wisconsin has purposefully developed a reputation for speedy
adjudications.171 But, much like the experience of the Eastern District of
Virginia, Western Wisconsin has found that patent cases make it difficult to
achieve the district’s efficiency goals. According to Magistrate Judge
165 Judge Barbara Lynn on Patent Pilot Program, TEX. LAW. (2013), http://www.texaslawyer.com/
id=1202598369142.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 449, 477 &
n.196 (2010) (noting that some judges have “a strong interest in presiding over patent cases”
(citing Jordan T. Fowles & Tung T. Nguyen, Texas Litigators Go to Lake Tahoe, INTELL. PROP. L.
SEC. (State Bar of Tex., Austin, Tex.), 2007, at 2, available at http://www.texasbariplaw.org/
Portals/0/Newsletters/2007/2007%20Advanced%20Patent%20Lit%20Course.pdf )).
169 See whitself, Texas Smart, AGORACOM (Dec. 19, 2006), http://agoracom.com/ir/
patriot/forums/discussion/topics/134915-rules-of-the-court-and-frivolity/messages/519031, archived
at http://perma.cc/6JER-N5CQ (discussing the possibility of efficiency improvements in the
Southern District of Texas).
170 McKelvie, supra note 160, at 3.
171 See Allen A. Arntsen & Jeffrey A. Simmons, The Tundra Docket: Western District of
Wisconsin, LAW360 (Mar. 12, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/49923/the-tundradocket-western-district-of-wisconsin, archived at http://perma.cc/62FN-Z2ZG (“The Wisconsin
court’s ‘rocket docket’ status is nothing new. For the past ten years, the court has consistently
ranked between the first and fourth-fastest courts in the country in time to trial.”).
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Crocker of the Western District of Wisconsin, “We’ve become a patent
magnet for the world. We never invited them. They just came.”172
1. Judicial Incentive to Compete
What would motivate a judge or a group of judges on a court to engage
in the forum shopping game with litigants? In the case of courts seeking to
dissuade litigants from filing in their courtrooms, the answer seems
obvious: most federal judges have a large and ever-growing caseload—they
do not want to see additional difficult cases arrive on their docket.
Furthermore, patent cases are both complex and time-consuming. By
reducing patent filings, judges can decrease their workload and focus on
trimming their case backlog.
But why would a judge (or a court) want to attract litigants? Shouldn’t
they want to do precisely the opposite? Because of their fixed salaries,
judges do not profit directly from increased filings in their courtrooms.173
In fact, by attracting more cases, a judge increases her already large
workload with no accompanying pay increase.174 Some explanation of the
incentives for courts to seek out litigants is therefore in order.
a. Individual Incentives
Courts consist of individuals who possess distinct desires and interests,
and the motivations of individual judges often fail to align with the
motivations of their fellow judges.175 Thus, any discussion of courts and the
incentives of courts must necessarily examine the incentives of individual
judges within those courts. While judges receive no direct monetary
benefits for adjudicating particular types or numbers of cases, they may
benefit in less tangible ways.
Personal Interest: Perhaps the most obvious reason that judges might seek
to attract certain cases is a personal preference for hearing those cases.
Judge Ward himself has cited “the intellectual challenge” of patent cases as
172 Jerry Crimmins, Patent Plaintiffs Flock to ‘Rocket Docket’ in Wis., CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Aug. 14, 2008, available at http://www.whdlaw.com/Resources/File/Carter.ChicLawBull.8.08.pdf.
173 See Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public
Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 833-34 (providing context regarding the structure and
operaton of judicial compensation and incentives).
174 See Posner, supra note 45, at 11 (discussing the way in which many judges are motivated to
maximize “leisure”).
175 Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 254 (1992) (“Individuals have intentions and purpose and motives;
collections of individuals do not. To pretend otherwise is fanciful.”).
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the reason he has encouraged patent litigants to file in his courtroom.176 A
judge may have a personal preference for patent cases over other types of
cases that appear on the court’s docket.177 While the appeal of patent cases
is far from universal among judges,178 ninety-four district judges from the
fourteen districts have volunteered to participate in the Patent Pilot
Program,179 indicating that there are a number of judges who enjoy the
work of adjudicating such cases.
Reputational Effects: Richard Posner has suggested that federal judges
(like him) are motivated by the same “instrumental and consumption goals”
that motivate private individuals.180 For Posner, judges are simply selfinterested, rational actors like everyone else.181 However, as he admits,
there are key differences between judges and private individuals, namely,
private individuals are motivated by increased earning potential while
federal judges have a fixed income for life.182 Posner recognizes that
“prestige is unquestionably an element of the judicial utility function.”183
However, he dismisses prestige as a major factor in judicial decisionmaking

176 See Pusey, supra note 109; Barrie McKenna, Venue Shopping? See You in Marshall, GLOBE &
MAIL (May 4, 2006, 9:54 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/technology/venue-shoppingsee-you-in-marshall/article1099055, archived at http://perma.cc/3TV7-JA85 (reporting an interview
with Judge Ward about his docket).
177 See Tim McGlone, Resigning Judge Says He Was Tired of Drug and Gun Cases,
PILOTONLINE.COM (Feb. 14, 2008), http://hamptonroads.com/2008/02/resigning-judge-says-hewas-tired-drug-and-gun-cases, archived at http://perma.cc/Z75K-ET6S (reporting that U.S.
District Judge Walter D. Kelley, Jr., enjoyed complex patent cases more than drug and gun cases).
178 See Dionne Searcey, Judges Outsource Workloads as Cases Get More Complex, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 29, 2013, 5:40 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303983904579095
593058503678, archived at http://perma.cc/6PFM-2PB4 (quoting Royal Furgeson, a now retired
district court judge for the Northern District of Texas, who acknowledged that to him, as an
English major, it had been helpful to appoint special masters in patent cases “to kind of unravel
some of that stuff ”).
179 Ron Vogel, The Patent Pilot Program: Reassignment Rates and the Effect of Local Patent Rules,
N.Y. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N BULL. (N.Y. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, Fort Lee, N.J.), Oct.–
Nov. 2013, at 5-6 app. C (listing judges participating in the program).
180 Posner, supra note 45, at 39.
181 See id. at 23-30 (comparing the decisionmaking process of judicial voting to making
decisions in other areas of life); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
505-06 (3d ed. 1986) (arguing that the utility function of judges is similar to that of other people
though judges may also “seek to impose their personal preferences and values on society”). See
generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975) (examining the motivations of judges).
182 See Posner, supra note 45, at 13 (theorizing that judges are not motivated solely by money
because of their tenure and fixed salaries).
183 Id.
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because “there is little an individual judge can do to enhance his prestige as
a judge.”184
For district court judges, however, one available means of enhancing
one’s judicial reputation is by becoming an expert in handling particularly
difficult types of cases. Creating a reputation as a competent patent judge
can, in fact, enhance one’s judicial prestige. Patent cases are widely
recognized as extraordinarily complex and difficult cases.185 Because of the
difficulty of trying patent cases and the large damage sums potentially at
stake, patent cases also tend to be tried by highly competent and wellcompensated counsel. Gaining a reputation for efficient and fair handling
of patent cases can elevate the stature of a judge among both the bar and
his peers on the bench.
Indeed, certain district court judges have developed such a reputation
for competence in patent cases. These judges have distinguished themselves
as preeminent triers of patent cases, despite that they—like all federal
district judges—are generalists.186 If, as Posner suggests, prestige makes up
part of the judicial utility function, then the ability to establish oneself as
an expert adjudicator of complex cases—such as patent cases—would be an
incentive for judges to attract more patent cases to their courtrooms.
The prestige associated with being an expert patent trial judge brings
other potential benefits as well. Specialized bar groups, as well as patent bar
associations like the American Intellectual Property Association, often
invite judges to speak at their conferences.187 Judges from the Eastern
District of Texas, the District of Delaware, and the Northern District of
California therefore receive a large number of invitations to such

184

Id. at 13-14.
See Smith, supra note 147, at 9 (discussing the amount of time that judges must devote to
patent cases as opposed to other civil matters).
186 See, e.g., Edward Reines, Northern District of California’s New Patent Rules, PATENTLY-O
(Feb. 3, 2008), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2008/02/northern-distri.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
66CG-NYQ6 (referring to Judge Whyte as “a leading jurist in the patent field”); Hal Wegner,
Next Tuesday! Chief Judge Holderman (N.D. Ill.), Leading Patent Jurist, Speaks at GW April 16th;
Sidney Katz Remembered, L.A. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.laipla.net/nexttuesday-chief-judge-holderman-n-d-ill-leading-patent-jurist-speaks-at-gw-april-16th-sidney-katzremembered, archived at http://perma.cc/USY5-4FG2 (referring to Judge Holderman as “one of
the more influential members of the Federal Judiciary in the patent area”). Judge Jordan, now a
judge on the Third Circuit, continues to sit by designation in the district court in patent cases. See
Hon. Kent A. Jordan, THE SEDONA CONF., https://thesedonaconference.org/bio/jordan-kent (last
visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/T3WZ-59QC.
187 See, e.g., THE SEDONA CONF., https://thesedonaconference.org (last visited Jan. 16,
2015), archived at https://perma.cc/6VZG-G59B (stating that the conference’s mission is to invite
bright legal minds to speak about intellectual property rights).
185
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conferences.188 To the extent that professional reputation is a desirable
commodity, increasing patent filings in an effort to be perceived as an
expert may appeal to judges.
Indeed, the prestige associated with being a well-known patent trial
judge can lead to post-judicial opportunities. Recently, a number of judges
from patent-heavy districts have retired from the judiciary and entered
private practice as patent litigators.189 In fact, the last two chief judges of
the Eastern District of Texas have left the bench for private practice.190 In
many cases, former judges who leave the bench to practice patent law had
little to no experience with patent law prior to serving as a judge.191
b. Institutional Incentives
Local Benefits. Another reason that courts might seek to increase filings
in a particular legal field is to benefit the local communities in which they
reside. Local bar associations are often closely tied with the judges that sit
in their localities.192 Those associations have an interest in increasing the
legal work within their communities. Because judges often come from those
same bar groups and retain friendships and relationships within those
groups, they may feel a sense of pride bringing in business for local

188

Id.
Judge Ward retired from the Eastern District of Texas in 2011 and is now a partner of his
own firm. See T. John Ward, WARD & SMITH L. FIRM, http://www.wsfirm.com/attorneys/t-johnward (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/GRW5-BX7T. Judge Folsom retired
from the Eastern District of Texas in 2012 and is now a partner at Jackson Walker LLP,
specializing in intellectual property cases. See David Folsom, JACKSON WALKER LLP,
http://www.jw.com/David_Folsom (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PJ2CF6UB.
190 See T. John Ward, supra note 189; David Folsom, supra note 189.
191 For example, Judge Farnan of the District of Delaware, a former U.S. Attorney, retired
from the bench in 2010 and started a law firm with his sons; he lists his specialty as “patent
litigation and consulting.” See Joseph J. Farnan, Jr., FARNAN LLP, http://www.farnanlaw.com/JoeFarnan-Bio.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/YJY2-PH9A.
192 For instance, in the Western District of Pennsylvania, the district’s selection for the
Patent Pilot Program was seen by both judges and the local patent bar as an opportunity to
increase the ability to compete for “out of state” patent cases. See supra notes 163-64 and
accompanying text (describing the courts’ role in encouraging patent cases to be brought in their
jurisdiction).
189
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attorneys.193 Many district courts, including Delaware and Eastern Texas,
have rules that require local counsel in all cases before the court.194
Patent attorneys are particularly interested in connecting with local
federal judges since all patent cases are tried in federal court. Thus, local
patent bars are often well-connected with their local judges. Indeed, many
judges have commented on the potential benefit of bringing patent cases to
their local communities.195
The spillover effects of increased litigation can also extend beyond the
legal field. A number of cities within the boundaries of the Eastern District
of Texas have seen a substantial increase in demand for office space and
hotel rooms due to the visiting attorneys who come to town for trial.196
Bureaucracy Theory. Scholars have long recognized that governmental
institutions often seek to maximize the institutions’ budget.197 Bureaucracy
theorists posit that agency officials care about “salary, perquisites of the
office, public reputation, power, patronage, output of the bureau, ease of
making changes, and ease of managing the bureau,” all of which depend to
some degree on the size of the agency’s budget.198 The employees of the
agency, so the theory goes, share an interest in budget maximization
because the benefits of having a larger budget redound to them in the form
of greater career prospects.199
The budget of each district court is controlled by the Administrative
Office of the Courts. For a court seeking to maximize its budget, increased
workloads are one way of getting a larger slice of the judicial budgetary pie.
Additionally, districts with larger caseloads may receive funds for
improvements and upgrades to physical facilities, courtroom technology,
193 See Hensley-Clancy, supra note 164 (discussing judges’ enthusiasm for the Patent Pilot
Program, in part based on the benefits to the local legal community).
194 For instance, both the District of Delaware and the Eastern District of Virginia require
local counsel in all civil cases. See D. DEL. R. 83.5(d); BANKR. D. DEL. R. 9010-1(c); E.D. VA.
LOC. ADM. R. 83.1(D)(1)(b).
195 See Hensley-Clancy, supra note 164 (predicting that the increase in patent cases will bring
more work for local patent attorneys and that larger firms may also establish local offices).
196 See Dahl, supra note 108 (“[T]he steady pace of out-of-town-lawyers—who often arrive in
large numbers for a high-stakes trial—has created a regular flow of money into [Marshall,
Texas].”).
197 See generally WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT (1971) (applying economics to the study of bureaus and governments).
198 Id. at 38.
199 William A. Niskanen, A Reflection on Bureaucracy and Representative Government, in
THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISALS AND EVIDENCE 13, 18-19 (André Blais
& Stéphane Dion eds., 1991); see also Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public
Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 870-71 (2014) (stating that even lower-level employees share
an interest in budget maximization due to trickle down effects).
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and administrative personnel. For example, the courtrooms in the Eastern
District of Texas were recently renovated, in part to accommodate the
district’s high caseload.200
Perhaps the largest bureaucratic benefit of increased caseloads is the
potential for an additional judgeship for the district.201 Increasing the
number of judges in a district locks in higher budgetary outlays as judicial
salaries are constitutionally protected and district budgets are largely tied
to the number of judges in the district.202 Additionally, each judge is
automatically allowed to hire an assistant and one or two law clerks.
District courts that have higher civil case loads also tend to have a greater
number of personnel, including magistrate judges who assist judges in the
adjudication process.203
2. Judicial Ability to Compete
If we assume that judges may, in some instances, be motivated to
compete for litigants, what tools can those judges use to attract litigants? A
wide variety of characteristics influence forum shopping, but many are
outside of a court’s control. For instance, the makeup of a court’s potential
jury pool is highly important to litigants, yet it is also a characteristic that
courts cannot change or improve. The quality of a district’s jury pool is a
function of the job opportunities and educational offerings found within a
district’s boundaries.204 Courts have no direct impact on demographic
factors.
More fundamentally, courts are unable to offer explicitly what the
forum shopper is ultimately seeking, namely, a successful suit. Simply
offering victory to the highest bidder is antithetical to the judicial process.

200

Nguyen, supra note 91, at 142 n.153.
See, e.g., Letter from the Honorable B. Lynn Winmill, Chief Dist. Judge, Dist. of Idaho,
to Senator Mike Crapo et al. 1 (Aug. 15, 2013), available at http://www.judgingtheenvironment.org/
library/letters/New-judgeships-ID-J-Winmill-Myers-8-15-13.pdf (“[T]he formula for allocating
funds to the [district courts] is driven, in large part, by the number of judicial officers in each
district.”).
202 See id. at 1-2 (explaining the relationship between the district’s budget and the number of
judgeships in the district).
203 HEYDEBRAND & SERON, supra note 46, at 94 (“[T]he size of the court’s total personnel
resources is explained, in large part, by the combined effect of the governmental sector (b* = .69)
and civil filings (b* = .23).”).
204 See Carol J. Mills & Wayne E. Bohannon, Juror Characteristics: To What Extent Are They
Related to Jury Verdicts?, 64 JUDICATURE 22, 25 (1980) (examining the relationship between jury
decisionmaking and juror characteristics such as race, age, gender, and education).
201
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The notion of selling justice is abhorrent to notions of equity and fair-play.205
Courts and judges in the United States have vehemently and consistently
rejected such an idea. The courts have successfully limited corruption in
judicial dealings through a number of mechanisms.
One of the most important of these corruption-deterring mechanisms is
appellate review.206 If a trial court judge or an entire court were to dole out
justice without reliance on sound legal principles, the appellate court
assigned to review the case would quickly reverse the trial court’s decision.
This second look at cases limits a trial court’s ability to increase filings by
always siding with the plaintiff. In essence, the trial courts can be thought
to operate in a heavily regulated environment. Even if a court desired to
explicitly offer successful outcomes to plaintiffs, it could not do so because
judicial checks are built into the system.
But district courts that are interested in impacting venue decisions have
some tools at their disposal. In general, by decreasing the uncertainty and
risk inherent in litigation in ways favorable to plaintiffs, courts can try to
compete with other courts for those litigants. If a court or a judge can
increase the odds of success for plaintiffs (even slightly) and signal that fact
to future plaintiffs, the court may be successful in attracting cases to its
court.
One way to attract plaintiffs is to offer appealing procedural rules that
are not offered by other courts. Even though all district courts are bound by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a number of district courts have
adopted additional procedural rules for patent cases—called patent local
rules (PLRs)—often in an attempt to attract litigants.207 Some litigants
prefer litigating in districts with PLRs because case scheduling and
discovery proceed in a more predictable manner than they might otherwise.
Some litigants prefer PLRs because they may inherently favor their side.
A second way to attract litigants is by offering more predictable case
management procedures than other courts. Case management refers to a
court’s administrative oversight of the litigation process.208 Decisions
205 See Ian Ayres, The Twin Faces of Judicial Corruption: Extortion and Bribery, 74 DENV. U. L.
REV. 1231, 1235 (1997) (“[A] judge’s action in agreeing to receive money is morally repugnant
regardless of whether the agreement is an extortion or a bribe.”).
206 See generally Paul D. Carrington, The Power of District Judges and the Responsibility of Courts
of Appeals, 3 GA. L. REV. 507 (1969) (examining the role of appellate review in United States
federal courts).
207 For a discussion of the history of patent local rules, see Ware & Davy, supra note 110.
208 See PETER S. MENELL ET AL., PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT JUDICIAL GUIDE 1-2 (2d
ed. 2012) (discussing the importance of judicial oversight of patent cases to avoid excessive
burdens on the court).
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concerning the flow and process of litigation are often insulated from
appellate review by the abuse of discretion standard.209 While case
management decisions are often not reviewable or are reviewed with a high
level of deference on appeal, they can be extremely important to litigants.
For instance, a judge’s decision on the length of time for or the scope of the
discovery process can at times be as important as a decision on a legal
issue.210 Judges and courts establish discovery norms. If predictable, those
discovery norms can appeal to plaintiffs and encourage more filings.
Because district courts control most case management decisions and
those decisions can be important to litigants, one would expect such
decisions to be a primary way in which district courts seek to attract
litigation to their courtrooms. This is precisely what has occurred in patent
law.
a. Procedural Distinctions: Patent Local Rules
Among the forum-shopping factors that districts can control, perhaps
none is as effective at signaling a district’s interest in attracting patent
litigants as the creation of patent local rules.211 Patent local rules establish
procedural rules and schedules for the handling of patent cases in a district.
In districts with PLRs, litigants know ex ante the general format and
timeline that any potential patent suit might take. For the great majority of
litigants interested in reducing uncertainty, PLRs can be very appealing.
In 2000, the Northern District of California became the first district
court to adopt patent local rules.212 The Northern District’s PLRs
established standards for initial case management conferences,213 required
heightened pleading standards,214 and set a detailed schedule for managing
the claim construction portion of patent cases.215 Numerous districts have

209

See Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976) (per
curiam) (adopting the abuse of discretion standard in a case dismissed for discovery violations).
210 See also Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery Beyond the Federal Rules, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 321,
334-36 (2008) (discussing the importance of the scope of e-discovery in commercial disputes,
marital litigation, personal injury, and trade secret theft and the impact on the underlying
litigation).
211 See McKelvie, supra note 160, at 3 (explaining that while adopting local rules may not
necessarily increase patent filings, it indicates that judges are more familiar with patent cases and
are more open to trying them).
212 Ware & Davy, supra note 110, at 979.
213 Id. at 980.
214 Id. at 983-84.
215 Id. at 996-98.
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followed the lead of the Northern District of California in adopting
PLRs.216
Of course, not all plaintiffs prefer filing in districts with PLRs. One of
the leading venues for patent litigation over the last decade—the Central
District of California—does not have formalized patent rules, but the
district has consistently drawn large numbers of patent cases to its courts.217
A large population and concentration of technology companies is likely the
primary driver of the popularity of the Central District, but some have
argued that the flexibility of a court that is not bound by the strict timeline
of PLRs can attract litigants who may want to propose alternative schedules
and timeframes to the court.218
Adopting local rules does not guarantee that patent litigants will
suddenly prefer a particular district court. The Western District of
Pennsylvania adopted local rules in 2005 in an effort to signal its desire to
hear more patent cases.219 The district has not seen a significant increase in
patent filings since that time.220 Other districts, including the Western
District of Tennessee, the Western District of North Carolina, the District
of Idaho, and the District of New Hampshire, have adopted PLRs in an
effort to attract litigants, but with little success.221
Indeed, although PLRs may serve as a signal that a district court is
interested in attracting patent cases, adopting PLRs has generally failed to
increase filings in a district. Empirical evidence has found no correlation
between adoption of PLRs and an increase in patent case volume.222 In
some ways, PLRs represent an announcement that a district court is
216

Id. at 1011.
See Erin Coe, Central Calif. Tops Eastern Texas as Patent Hot Spot, LAW360 ( July 7, 2010,
4:31 PM), http://www.law360.com/topnews/articles/163315/central-calif-tops-eastern-texas-as-patenthot-spot, archived at http://perma.cc/NK8R-62QR (“The Central District of California is also a
sought-after jurisdiction for plaintiffs because, unlike the Eastern District of Texas, it does not
have local patent rules and provides more opportunities for parties to quickly resolved [sic] their
disputes . . . .”).
218 See id. (quoting Mark Scarsi, head of Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy LLP’s West
Coast IP litigation team, as saying that “[t]he Central District of California is more flexible, and
parties are free to propose different procedures to put issues to the court earlier”).
219 See Nguyen, supra note 168, at 487 (detailing the Western District of Pennsylvania’s
efforts to attract patent cases); see also Henry M. Sneath & Robert O. Lindefjeld, Fast Track Patent
Litigation: Toward More Procedural Certainty and Cost Control, 73 DEF. COUNS. J. 201, 201 (2006)
(stating that the Western District of Pennsylvania hoped its PLRs would draw “a larger share of
the regional and national patent litigation claims” to its courtrooms).
220 McKelvie, supra note 160, at 3.
221 See generally La Belle, supra note 10.
222 See Vogel, supra note 179, at 2-3 (describing a study that found no significant difference in
caseloads between districts after PLRs were adopted).
217
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interested in hearing patent cases. While courts can advertise their interest,
plaintiffs are generally in control of the venue decision—at least until a
court considers transfer.
b. Case Management Distinctions
The second major category of tools that courts can employ when
competing for litigants is the administrative management of their cases.
There are many ways that a court might devise attractive or repellant case
management practices. This subsection will focus on four practices that
have been employed successfully in court competition for patent cases: (1)
case assignment procedures, (2) trial philosophy, (3) reluctance to transfer,
and (4) speed.
i. Case Assignment Procedure: The Ability to Judge Shop
As any experienced litigator will tell you, the judge assigned to a case is
more important than the district in which the case is filed.223 Certain judges
have reputations for being irrational, curmudgeonly, or unfair while others
are viewed as even-handed, fair, or easy-going.224 Most districts have
procedures for assigning cases that limit the ability of any particular
plaintiff to select any particular judge.225 This system does not guarantee
fairness, but it attempts to ensure that each case has roughly the same odds
of landing before any particular judge.
If a court intends to attract filings, however, eliminating or reducing the
random nature of case assignments can help.226 Two districts, the Eastern
District of Texas and the Eastern District of Virginia, have tinkered with
their case assignment procedures with an eye toward impacting patent
litigation filings. As detailed in subsection II.A.2.c, supra, the Eastern
District of Virginia reconfigured its judge assignment procedures in

223 One need look no further for proof of this maxim than that judge shopping receives
universal contempt, whereas forum shopping gets mixed reviews. See Kimberly Jade Norwood,
Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 300-01 (1996)
(comparing the judicial system’s differing views on forum shopping and judge shopping).
224 See Weyman I. Lundquist, The New Art of Forum Shopping, 11 LITIG. 21, 22 (1985)
(discussing forum shopping strategies used to avoid “Judge Curmudgeon”).
225 See, e.g., United States v. Mavroules, 798 F. Supp. 61, 61 (D. Mass. 1992) (noting that
random assignment “prevents judge shopping by any party, thereby enhancing public confidence
in the assignment process”).
226 Lynn LoPucki demonstrated that the single-judge nature of Delaware’s bankruptcy court
was a boon for attracting litigants in the 1990s because litigants who filed in Delaware knew the
judge for their case ex ante. See generally LOPUCKI, supra note 17.
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2002.227 The district’s new assignment procedure increased the uncertainty
of judge and divisional assignment of patent cases—and only patent
cases.228 The increased unpredictability of judge assignment has reduced
the appeal of the district to patent litigants, which was the goal behind the
amended procedure.229
Like the Eastern District of Virginia, the Eastern District of Texas has,
over the years, modified its case assignment procedure for patent cases.
Unlike its counterpart in Virginia, however, the Eastern District of Texas
altered its procedures with an eye towards increasing the district’s appeal to
patent plaintiffs.
The Eastern District of Texas is split into six divisions: Texarkana,
Marshall, Sherman, Beaumont, Tyler, and Lufkin.230 Because the district
can have up to eight active judges, a random case assignment procedure
would force litigants to risk assignment to a judge who has handled
relatively few patent cases or who dislikes patent cases entirely.231 To reduce
the risk of drawing an unsatisfactory judge for a patent case, the Eastern
District has adopted a case assignment system that allows plaintiffs, in some
instances, to select a particular judge.
The district’s case assignment system is nominally random.232 However,
the Chief Judge, in accordance with his powers under 28 U.S.C. § 137,
periodically issues general orders that modify the percentage of divisional
cases that are assigned to particular judges.233 The patent case assignment
proportions in the Eastern District of Texas differ from the general civil
case assignment proportions: a particular judge might be assigned 50% of
the general civil cases filed in Texarkana division, yet be assigned 100% of
the patent cases filed there.234

227

See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
229 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
230 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT: EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS,
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/page1.shtml?location=info (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/7YB6-9FC8.
231 See Mike McKool, Founder of McKool Smith in Dallas, TEX. LAW., http://www.texaslawyer.com/
id=1202520214208 (lasted visited Feb. __, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/ETE2-H7LM
(espousing lawyers’ fear that Judge Marcia Crane would preside over their patent case since she
had little experience and seemed not to like patent cases).
232 Brooke Terpening, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Analysis of H.R. 5418, 4 FLA.
INT’L U. L. REV. 287, 311 (2008).
233 See id. at 311-12 (explaining that the fixed percentage of cases the Chief Judge assigns to
each judge depends on “shifting workloads, recusals, new appointments, and retirements”).
234 See id.
228
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Examining the most recent general order reveals numerous ways to
choose a particular judge in the Eastern District of Texas. If a litigant
prefers Judge Clark, for example, he or she need only file the case in either
Beaumont or Lufkin because Judge Clark is assigned 100% of patent cases
filed in those districts.235 Before the most recent update of the district’s
assignment procedures in April 2014, one could file a patent case in the
Tyler division and enjoy a 95% chance of drawing Judge Davis (the other
5% of patent cases were assigned to Judge Schneider).236 Before Judge
Ward—one of the most experienced patent district court jurists in the
United States—stepped down from the bench, one could file in Marshall or
Texarkana, where he drew 100% of the patent cases filed.237 Judge Gilstrap,
who previously had the heaviest patent caseload in the country, presides
over all cases filed in the Marshall Division.238
The result of this unique judge assignment system for patent cases is a
predictable formula litigants can use to select their preferred jurist. Some
regular patent infringement plaintiffs, including non-practicing entities,
consistently file in a single division to have their cases heard before the
same judge.239 Indeed, as can be seen from the table below, two divisions
receive a disproportionate amount of the patent filings in the district:
filings in Tyler and Marshall consist of 91% of all patent filings in the
Eastern District of Texas.

235 General Order Assigning Civil and Criminal Actions 11-2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2011),
available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?document=20087.
236 Id.
237 General Order Assigning Civil and Criminal Actions 08-15 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2008),
available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?document=1925.
238 General Order Assigning Civil and Criminal Actions 14-8 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2014),
available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?document=24426.
239 See Leychkis, supra note 106, at 214 (explaining that the Eastern District of Texas has
become the district of choice for patent trolls who prefer the local juries and the ability to bring
almost all of their cases before the same judge).
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Table 1: Eastern District of Texas Case Filings By Division 2012240
Division
Beaumont
Marshall
Sherman
Tyler
Lufkin
Total for All
Divisions

Cases
24
600
58
562
22
1266

% of All
1.9%
47.4%
4.6%
44.4%
1.7%
100%

Plaintiffs
31
710
73
864
22
1700

Defendants
104
1101
121
1258
58
2642

Because the district’s case assignment system permits judge shopping,
many non-practicing entities consistently select the same judge. In fact,
since 1999, Data Treasury Corporation, Orion IP, and IAP Intermodal have
collectively filed thirty-seven patent suits in the district.241 Each company
has filed every one of their lawsuits before a single judge: Data Treasury’s
cases have all been heard by Judge Folsom, Orion’s by Judge Davis, and
IAP’s by Judge Ward.242
The ratio of patent cases assigned to each judge is constantly changing
in the Eastern District of Texas.243 But it is generally true that at any
particular time at least one division will send all of its patent cases to one
judge.244 Likewise, it is almost always true that each division has no more
than two judges handling the patent cases filed in any particular district.245
This situation permits litigants to have much more control over one of the
primary motivations behind forum shopping: drawing the most
advantageous judge possible. Indeed, the assignment system in the Eastern
District of Texas permits litigants to move beyond forum shopping to judge
shopping. In contrast with forum shopping, which has both critics and

240 James C. Pistorino, 2012 Trends in Patent Case Filings and Venue: Eastern District of Texas
Most Popular for Plaintiffs (Again) But 11 Percent Fewer Defendants Named Nationwide, PERKINS
COIE, Feb. 2013, at 10 tbl.4, available at http://www.perkinscoie.com/images/content/2/8/v2/
28227/lit-13-02pistorino-2012article.pdf.
241 Leychkis, supra note 106, at 215 tbl.8.
242 Id.
243 Previous divisions of labor allowed even more blatant judge shopping. See, e.g., General
Order Assigning Civil and Criminal Actions 09-20 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/view_document.cgi?document=2256 (assigning many cases
from one district to only one judge).
244 Compare General Order, supra note 235, with General Order, supra note 237.
245 Compare General Order, supra note 235, with General Order, supra note 237.
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defenders, judge shopping is almost universally condemned by both
commentators and judges themselves.246
ii. Preference for Trials
Some courts gain a reputation as being particularly open to staging
trials. Most patentees want to have the threat of reaching trial, as juries are
more likely than judges to uphold patent validity and find patents
infringed.247 Thus, districts that are seen as more likely to advance a case to
trial tend to be more attractive venues for patentee plaintiffs.248
The Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware are the top
two venues for litigants seeking trial, or at least the threat of trial.249 On
average, 2.8% of U.S. patent cases reach trial, but in those two districts 8%
and 11.8% of patent cases, respectively, reach a final decision before a jury or
judge.250 The Western District of Wisconsin and the Eastern District of
Virginia, two other districts with sizable patent dockets, follow closely
behind with 7.4% and 6.4% of cases reaching trial.251
Courts can establish norms that preference trials in a number of ways.
First, some courts—such as Delaware—obtain a reputation for conservative
application of summary judgment.252 When faced with a dispositive
summary judgment motion, judges in Delaware are more likely to err on
the side of caution and send the case to trial than other courts. And some of
the summary judgment precautions in Delaware are unique to patent cases.
For example, some judges in Delaware require additional “screening
procedures” for summary judgment motions in patent cases.253 Those
screening procedures include requiring parties to submit briefs to seek
246 See Norwood, supra note 223, at 299-300 (“[J]udge-shopping is still ‘universally
condemned’ by the courts.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
247 See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 212 tbl.3 (1998) (finding that patentees win 67% of jury verdicts on
validity but only 28% of pretrial motions); Lemley, supra note 2, at 403 (explaining that when
patent owners select a forum, “[t]hey know that most summary judgment rulings favor defendants
in patent cases, but that juries tend to be far more pro-patentee”).
248 See id.
249 Id. at 411 tbl.4.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 See Lee, supra note 138 (observing that Delaware judges are “relatively slow to rule on
summary judgment motions,” which increases litigation costs for defendants and gives plaintiffs
the upper hand in settlement negotiations).
253 See Parsons, supra note 135, at 157 (describing the additional procedural requirements
prescribed by Judge Sleet and former Judge Farnan for summary judgment motions in patent
cases).
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permission to file summary judgment motions and certified statements
assuring the court that no material factual dispute exists.254 The additional
layers of procedural complexity required to file for summary judgment in
Delaware partially explain the low rates of patent cases that terminate at
the summary judgment stage.255
Second, a court can encourage trial by expediting the process of getting
to trial. For litigants, time is money. The longer a case drags out before
trial, the greater incentive there is for both sides to settle. Courts with
reputations as “rocket dockets” (such as the Eastern District of Virginia and
the Western District of Wisconsin) likely get to trial more often than most
courts simply because trials tend to occur more quickly in those courts.256
Third, courts can strictly enforce calendar dates established before trial or
in PLRs. The Eastern District of Texas has a reputation for inflexibility on
trial delays and calendaring changes, while the Central District of
California is much less inclined to get to trial and often delays cases for
relatively long periods of time.257
iii. Reluctance to Transfer
Judges have a great deal of discretion in deciding motions to transfer
venue.258 Transfer is permitted when doing so is in the “interest of
justice.”259 Certain district courts have developed a reputation as unwilling
to transfer cases to another forum. Forums that have obtained such a
reputation are more appealing to patentees because their initial choice of
forum is likely to be the final forum.
The Eastern District of Virginia transfers a higher percentage of its
patent cases to other forums than most districts.260 Forum shopping
plaintiffs are well aware of a court’s likelihood to transfer a case. After all,
254

Id.
See id. at 156-57 (noting that in 2003 and 2004, “the vast majority” of summary judgment
motions were denied in Delaware and, of those that were granted, none disposed of the entire
case).
256 See supra subsection II.A.2.c; see also Lemley, supra note 2, at 414-15 tbl.5 (organizing
district courts according to speed in reaching an ultimate disposition of the case with the Western
District of Wisconsin and the Eastern District of Virginia topping the list).
257 See Coe, supra note 217 (contrasting the strict schedule in the Eastern District of Texas
with the more flexible schedule in the Central District of California).
258 See Moore, supra note 5, at 898 (“[T]ransfer is a complicated inquiry very much at the
discretion of the district court.”).
259 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
260 See Moore, supra note 5, at 909, 915-16 (suggesting that patent plaintiffs file in the
Eastern District of Virginia due to judicial efficiency and expertise, which explains why the high
percentage (16%) of cases are transferred for lacking any connection to the forum).
255
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the real advantage of forum shopping is undermined if the chosen court
simply transfers the case to a less desirable forum.
On the other hand, the most popular current destinations for patent
plaintiffs—the Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware—
both have reputations as districts that are unlikely to grant transfer
motions.261 That reputation likely reassures forum shopping plaintiffs. Until
very recently, the Federal Circuit has chosen not to interfere with district
court venue selection. In fact, before 2008, the Federal Circuit consistently
interpreted the patent venue statute quite broadly.262 Prior to December
2008, the Federal Circuit had never, in its twenty-six years of existence,
reversed a district court’s denial of a motion to transfer venue.263
Since 2008, however, the Federal Circuit has taken a much more active
interest in venue disputes. The Federal Circuit entered the forum selection
fray following a decision from the Fifth Circuit overturning the Eastern
District of Texas’s denial of a transfer motion in a products liability
lawsuit.264 In a surprise move, the Federal Circuit granted a mandamus
appeal to review a denial of a motion to transfer out of the Eastern District
of Texas in In re TS Tech USA Corp.265 Since TS Tech, the Federal Circuit
has granted mandamus review on seven motions to transfer.266 All but one
of the mandamus actions have arisen out of the Eastern District of Texas.
The outlier involved a decision by the Northern District of California to
grant a transfer motion into the Eastern District of Texas.267

261 See, e.g., Offen-Brown, supra note 104, at 73 (noting that until 2008, “it was difficult to
obtain transfer” from jurisdictions like the Eastern District of Texas); Parsons, supra note 135, at
151 (“Transfer motions in Delaware are rarely granted.”). But see Paul M. Janicke, Venue Transfers
from the Eastern District of Texas: Case by Case or an Endemic Problem?, LANDSLIDE, Mar.–Apr.
2010, at 16, 16 (finding that the percentage of patent cases transferred by the Eastern District of
Texas “was about the same” as the average nationwide in 2006 and “significantly more” in 2007).
262 See Moore, supra note 5, at 936 (lamenting the Federal Circuit’s conclusion that the
patent venue provisions are coextensive with personal jurisdiction with respect to corporate
defendants, rendering the patent venue statute “superfluous”).
263 Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. REV. 343, 346 (2012).
264 See In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 309 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(“Concluding that the district court gave undue weight to the plaintiffs’ choice of venue, ignored
our precedents, misapplied the law, and misapprehended the relevant facts, [the court] hold[s]
that the district court reached a patently erroneous result and clearly abused its discretion in
denying the transfer.”).
265 551 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
266 See In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Vistaprint Ltd., 628 F.3d
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Nintendo,
Co., 589 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 587 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
267 See In re Aliphcom, 449 F. App’x 33 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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iv. Speed
Another case management norm that deserves discussion is that of
speedy adjudication. Some districts have made the speed with which they
dispense justice an integral part of the district’s culture. The Eastern
District of Virginia has consistently been one of the most efficient places in
the country to try civil cases over the past three decades.268 In order to
become a “rocket docket,” the district adopted hard rules for setting trial
conferences and dates.269 The Western District of Wisconsin has also
become known as a particularly fast place in which to litigate cases. For
patent cases, both districts average less than eight months to resolution and
less than a year to reach trial.270
For many patent plaintiffs, speed kills; the faster a court conducts its
business, the faster a defendant must decide whether to risk a jury decision
or settle.271 Therefore, Western Wisconsin and Eastern Virginia are
attractive locations in which to litigate for a wide variety of litigants who
want to quickly resolve their dispute. But the appeal of a rocket docket can
often be self-limiting. When more and more patent cases clog a docket, it
becomes more difficult to maintain the status as a rocket docket. The
Eastern District of Virginia, in particular, began to be flooded with patent
litigation that threatened its status as an efficient purveyor of services.272
Judges from both the Eastern District of Virginia and the Western District
of Wisconsin have expressed dismay at the drag that a high number of
patent cases inflict on the speed of their civil docket.273
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF COURT COMPETITION
Judges and courts can, if they want, influence litigants’ venue choice in
patent cases. When courts are so inclined, they can attempt to attract or
dissuade patent litigants from filing in their courts by altering

268

See supra subsection II.A.2.c.
See Koenig, supra note 143, at 803 n.25 (recounting the changes brought about by Judge
Walter E. Hoffman designed to remove the case backlog and relieve the overburdened docket in
the Eastern District of Virginia).
270 See Lemley, supra note 2, at 414 tbl.5, 416 tbl.6 (showing the Western District of
Wisconsin and Eastern District of Virginia to have the shortest times to resolution and shortest
times to trial among districts with twenty-five or more outcomes).
271 See id. at 413 (noting that plaintiffs are interested in speedy resolutions to keep costs
down and to get quick relief in addition to building a war chest to sue other defendants).
272 See supra subsection II.A.2.c.
273 See supra notes 147 and 172 and accompanying text.
269
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administrative procedures in predictable ways that increase a plaintiff ’s
odds of achieving his or her goals. The previous Part should make clear,
however, that court competition differs in important ways from forum
shopping. Ultimately, court competition is a prelude to forum shopping:
courts or judges can establish case management norms that have the
potential to influence venue choices, but litigants retain the ultimate ability
to select venue.
This Part will discuss the implications of court competition for patent
law and for specialized legal areas more generally. This Part concludes with
an examination of potential randomization proposals for reducing the
forum shopping and court competition problems in patent law.
A. The Cost of Court Competition
It should be noted at the outset of any discussion of the drawbacks of
court competition that some scholars have argued in favor of court
competition. For instance, Xuan-Thao Nguyen has argued that the rise of
the Eastern District of Texas as a preeminent location for patent litigation
has improved the patent system as a whole.274 According to Nguyen, the
appeal of the Eastern District of Texas stems from aspects of the district
that are outcome neutral.275 Nguyen claims that litigants are attracted to the
Eastern District of Texas because of the knowledgeable and welcoming
jurists in the district, the district’s reputation for fairness and
reasonableness, its customer-oriented approach, and its unbiased jury
pool.276 As evidence of the improvement, Nguyen offers a number of
examples of litigants who were pleased with their experience before the
judges of the Eastern District.277 Scholars in other areas of the law have
made similar claims. In the bankruptcy context, scholars have argued that
Delaware’s successful bid to attract bankruptcy cases has led to salutary
effects on the bankruptcy system, including increased judicial expertise and
efficiency.278
274 Nguyen, supra note 91, at 155 (suggesting that instead of transforming the venue rules to
stop forum shopping, reformers should look to the Eastern District of Texas as an example of a
court transforming itself “into a knowledgeable center with strong expertise in solving patent
disputes”).
275 Id. at 136-37 (citing examples of judges’ expertise and local rules that enhance fairness in
the judicial process).
276 Id. at 136-43.
277 See, e.g., id. at 138-39 (detailing the successful and pleasant experience of one of the lead
counsels for Intel Corporation in a case tried in the Eastern District of Texas).
278 See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Whither the Race? A Comment on the
Effects of the Delawarization of Corporate Reorganizations, 54 VAND. L. REV. 283, 289-90 (2001)
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Proponents of court competition, however, rely on a shaky premise,
namely, that courts competing for litigation will not bend the adjudicative
process to favor one group of litigants over another. While this is almost
certainly true in most cases, it is also almost certainly not true in every case.
Indeed, courts that create favorable environments for plaintiffs are more
likely to win a competition for litigants than courts that maintain a more
neutral environment. Plaintiffs prefer courts that offer greater odds of
success. In essence, a competition for litigants favors courts that can offer
the most predictable advantages to one side. Thus, if one recognizes that
court competition will reward courts that favor plaintiffs, such competition
has the pernicious effect of undermining the ultimate fairness of the legal
process while simultaneously reducing confidence in the legal system.
Although Nguyen’s claims about the value of expertise are undoubtedly
true, the development of that expertise likely came at the expense of
evenhanded resolution of patent disputes, at least initially. Critics of the
early practices of the Eastern District of Texas point to the courts’ excessive
damage awards, inflexible and expensive discovery schedule, and reluctance
to transfer cases as examples of plaintiff-friendly rules that led to the rise of
the patent troll.279 While the current court appears to be much more
evenhanded in its handling of cases, the early years of the court left much
to be desired.280 If the court had not been extremely plaintiff-friendly in its
case management practices, it is unlikely that the judges in the district
would have been able to develop the expertise they now possess. Indeed,
the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court have taken steps to rein in the
Eastern District of Texas’s ability to attract litigants.281
A separate group of scholars has noted the legal innovation that can
occur when courts share jurisdiction with other courts. For instance, Craig
Nard and John Duffy have recently proposed an end to the Federal Circuit’s
exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases.282 If patent appeals were heard at
(disputing the suggestion that adjudicating a large proportion of major corporate bankruptcies in
Delaware is bad for social welfare); David A. Skeel, Jr., What’s So Bad About Delaware?, 54 VAND.
L. REV. 309, 325-29 (2001) (describing the “virtues of Delaware” including the ability of Delaware
judges to use their expertise to change quickly and refine their regulatory efforts).
279 See generally J. Jason Williams et al., Strategies for Combating Patent Trolls, 17 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 367 (2010) (discussing mechanisms used by districts such as the Eastern District of
Texas that encourage patent troll behavior).
280 See id. at 368-69 (noting that plaintiffs were 20% more likely to secure favorable
judgments in the Eastern District of Texas than the nationwide average).
281 See, e.g., supra notes 258-67 and accompanying text (discussing recent action by the
Federal Circuit in considering writs of mandamus for transfer of venue).
282 See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101
NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1650 (2007).
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various circuit courts, they argue, there would be greater experimentation
in patent jurisprudence that would lead to beneficial results for the patent
system.283
However, this group of scholars is speaking of a different sort of
competition than the one addressed in this Article. Those scholars are
addressing the optimal balance of power concentration between specialized
and generalist appellate courts.284 They are largely addressing decisions that
are made by appellate courts rather than trial courts. In the appellate
context, there are benefits to be had from a decentralized, multi-court
structure, including the ability to develop and test different legal
approaches to the same problem.285 Instead of competing for litigation
business and the accompanying expertise that comes with winning that
competition, appellate courts can “compete” in the sense of crafting legal
rules that best embody legislative policies. And the extent of such
competition is easily checked: legal innovations by appellate courts—which
often lead to “circuit splits”—are often reviewed by the Supreme Court.286
Conversely, district court administrative processes, such as case assignment
and case management procedures, are rarely studied and almost never
reviewed by appellate courts. Because of this, such procedures present a
perfect vehicle for engaging in competition for litigants.
Successful competition for litigants can certainly lead to expertise; the
Eastern District of Texas now has some of the most experienced and
seasoned patent trial judges in the country. But such expertise often comes
with a price. The Eastern District’s meteoric rise as an exceptional patent
court has met with harsh criticism from the bar. Indeed, Justice Scalia has
referred to the district as a “renegade jurisdiction[].”287
B. Court Competition as a Feature of Specialized Adjudication
Patent law is not alone in fostering competition among courts. Indeed,
beginning in the 1980s, courts in Delaware and New York sought to attract
bankruptcy filers with many of the same tools that the Eastern District of
Texas and others would employ decades later in an effort to attract patent
283 See id. at 1651-55 (arguing that a decentralized model would result in “new ideas and
approaches to challenges facing our patent system”).
284 See id. at 1626-27 & nn.31-36 (discussing scholarly works looking at the concentration of
power in areas such as the separation of powers doctrine, federalism, and international law).
285 Id. at 1653.
286 See id. (discussing the role of percolation in appellate review in order to create sound
binding precedent).
287 Nguyen, supra note 91, at 112.
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litigants.288 Bankruptcy cases, like other federal cases, are heard before
federal district courts. However, all districts have standing orders that refer
bankruptcy cases to the bankruptcy court within each district.289 A district
court may choose to hear the case itself,290 but in practice this rarely
occurs.291 In essence, bankruptcy courts are specialized courts within the
district courts. Appeals of bankruptcy court decisions go to the district
court in which the case arose and then to the circuit court of appeals for
that district.292
From 1974 to 1978, Congress made a comprehensive revision of the
bankruptcy code, including a change to the bankruptcy venue statute.293
The new statute stated that “a [bankruptcy] case . . . may be
commenced in the district court for the district in which the domicile,
residence, principal place of business . . . or principal assets . . . of
the person or entity” are located.294 By the 1990s, judicial interpretations of
the venue statute had liberalized bankruptcy venue to the point where large
public corporations were largely free to file in any bankruptcy court in the
United States.295
From 1980 to 1986, 32% of “big-case bankruptc[ies]” were filed in New
York courts.296 Much of the appeal of New York’s bankruptcy courts was
based on geography; firms entering bankruptcy often have major operations
in New York and the majority of bankruptcy professionals (lawyers,

288 See LOPUCKI, supra note 17, at 25-76 (describing how New York and Delaware courts
became attractive venues for bankruptcy litigation).
289 See Allen R. Kamp, Court Structure Under the Bankruptcy Code, 90 COM. L.J. 203, 208
(1985) (“[A]ll districts have promulgated a general order referring all bankruptcy cases to the
bankruptcy judges.”).
290 See id. (analyzing § 157(d) of the 1984 Bankruptcy Code and considering instances in
which a district court may withdraw a bankruptcy case).
291 See id. at 208-09 (noting that a case may be withdrawn for cause and that the legislative
history indicates that withdrawal should only be used sparingly).
292 Id. at 210-11.
293 See Martin I. Klein, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 5 (1979)
(outlining the changes to the jurisdiction and venue provisions including giving the district courts
original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under Title 11, which is delegated in turn to the
bankruptcy court).
294 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1) (2012).
295 See LOPUCKI, supra note 17, at 15; see also, e.g., In re Ocean Props. of Del., Inc., 95 B.R.
304, 305-07 (Bankr. D. Del. 1988) (granting a motion to transfer venue from Delaware, the state of
incorporation, to Florida, the location where the business is conducted); In re Del. & Hudson Ry.
Co., 96 B.R. 467, 467 (Bankr. D. Del. 1988) (noting that venue was proper in both Delaware and
New York for a Delaware corporation with corporate offices in New York).
296 LOPUCKI, supra note 17, at 47-48.
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accounting firms, and financial advisors) were located there.297 But New
York’s appeal went beyond geographic convenience. New York bankruptcy
courts tended to rule for bankruptcy filers on three key issues: extensions of
exclusivity,298 attorneys’ fees,299 and first-day orders.300 The handling of
those largely procedural issues (as well as an unusual case assignment
method301) drove New York bankruptcy dominance.
New York’s status as the go-to location for large bankruptcy cases,
however, was short-lived. By the early 1990s, Delaware had become the
leader in big bankruptcy filings.302 Lynn LoPucki has chronicled how
Delaware’s emergence as a bankruptcy court of choice was the result of the
efforts of Delaware’s lone bankruptcy judge, Judge Balick, to attract “a
major industry to her state.”303 Judge Balick’s case management techniques,
along with the predictability of case assignment in a one-judge district,
elevated Delaware to the top district for bankruptcy filings.304
297

Id. at 40.
Extensions of exclusivity permit the bankrupt firm to pay nothing to its creditors while
negotiations continue. Id. at 41. Between 1980 and 1986, New York courts extended exclusivity in
92% of cases compared with other courts that only extended exclusivity in 73% of cases. Id.
299 See id. at 44-45 (noting that New York courts, unlike courts in Philadelphia and Miami,
rarely restricted hourly attorney rates).
300 See id. at 45 (observing that New York courts recognized that “the practicalities of
operating a business in bankruptcy reorganization were often in conflict with the requirements of
the Bankruptcy Code” and were thus more accommodating than courts in other cities when such
conflicts arose).
301 LoPucki also noted that the New York courts had some irregularities in the case
assignment practices that may have appealed to bankruptcy filers. While the state claimed it was
employing a system of random case assignments, a single jurist, Judge Lifland of the Manhattan
Division of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, was
assigned eight of the thirteen cases filed in the five-judge district in 1985. Id. at 46-47. Judge
Lifland was particularly popular with bankruptcy filers, and he welcomed high profile cases to his
courtroom. See id. at 46 (“Judge Lifland wanted the big cases, and the debtors’ lawyers wanted
him to have them. In the early 1980s, New York was the most attractive bankruptcy venue in the
country, and Burton Lifland was the most attractive judge in that venue.”). Knowing that Judge
Lifland was likely to be assigned to big bankruptcy cases made filing in the Southern District of
New York very attractive to potential litigants.
302 See id. at 74 (noting that Delaware surpassed New York for number of big bankruptcy
case filings in 1992).
303 Id. at 76; see also id. at 56-74 (arguing that Judge Balick actively pursued bankruptcy
filings by making rulings favorable to bankruptcy filers).
304 Id. at 75 (noting the appeal of filing in a one-judge district). Because of the increase in
filings, Delaware was awarded a second bankruptcy judge in 1993, although the district did not
adopt the random case assignment model of New York. Id. at 74-75. The migration of big
bankruptcy cases towards New York and Delaware alarmed bankruptcy professionals in other
states. Beginning in Houston, members of affected cities’ local bankruptcy bars approached their
local bankruptcy judges and asked for changes in local rules and attorney fee rulings to make the
local courts competitive. Id. at 125-26.
298
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Delaware’s bankruptcy court engaged in many of the competitive
techniques that federal district courts have used to compete for patent
cases. For instance, the competition for both patent and bankruptcy cases
has involved small, seemingly unlikely locales as litigation hotspots:
Marshall, Texas and Wilmington, Delaware for patent cases and
Wilmington, Delaware for bankruptcy.305 In both instances, courts have
increased the speed with which they dispose of cases in an effort to attract
litigants.306 Both bankruptcy and federal district courts have also adopted
peculiar procedural rules meant to influence venue decisions,307 including
the elimination of random case assignment308 and a predilection to deny
motions to transfer.309 The history of court competition for both
bankruptcy and patent cases involves judges who gain important judicial
experience,310 as well as the prestige associated with complex and difficult
cases.311 Both instances demonstrate the importance of forum shopping to
the local economies in which the respective courts sit.312
There are, however, some intriguing differences between bankruptcy’s
experience with court competition and patent law’s experience. For
instance, some courts, like the Eastern District of Virginia, have sought to
reduce patent filings in their districts. This does not appear to be the case
when looking at competition for bankruptcy cases. Furthermore,
competition in patent cases is unique because it involves generalist judges
competing for a specialized docket. Federal district court judges are not
specialists, while bankruptcy judges hear only bankruptcy cases.
The parallels between district court competition for patent law and
bankruptcy court competition for bankruptcy cases suggest that the
creation of specialized courts may play a role in court competition. That
insight runs counter to the notion in the scholarship that specialized courts
reduce forum shopping.313 Judicial specialization might contribute to court
305

Id. at 51-53.
See id. at 117 (noting that the refiling rate in Delaware is high because “Delaware
processes cases faster than other jurisdictions”).
307 See id. at 125-26 (recounting the requests of Houston lawyers to their local bankruptcy
judges to make several procedural changes to attract more bankruptcy litigation to the city).
308 Id. at 75.
309 Id. at 38-39.
310 Id. at 39.
311 Id. at 19-20.
312 See id. at 128-29 (explaining how the increase in bankruptcy filings caused law firms to
expand in Delaware and impacted the local economy).
313 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 32 (discussing Congress’s belief that the Federal
Circuit would eliminate forum shopping); Moore, supra note 5, at 932-34 (arguing for the creation
of a specialized trial court to eliminate forum shopping); John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S.
306
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competition in different ways depending on the structure of the specialized
court. Bankruptcy and patent law have specialized courts at different levels
of the litigation process: bankruptcy cases are tried before specialist judges
and appealed to generalist geographic circuit courts; patent cases are tried
before generalist federal judges and appealed to the specialized Federal
Circuit.
Specialization at the appellate level may increase opportunities for court
competition in two ways: by increasing the relative value of district court
case management procedures to litigants and by leveling the court
competition playing field. Part of the attraction of appellate specialization
(or more precisely, centralization) is the resulting uniformity of the law in
the specialized area. Since legal disuniformity is the traditional driver of
forum shopping, it is thought that unifying the law will eliminate (or at
least reduce) forum shopping. But, when legal differences among fora are
eliminated, forum shoppers turn their attention to administrative and
procedural nuances among courts. Distinct, predictable, and favorable
administrative and procedural practices become increasingly appealing to
litigants who are unable to shop for distinctions based in law. The
uniformity of patent law throughout the country forces forum-shopping
plaintiffs to seek out advantageous case-management norms and procedural
differences. Before the Federal Circuit existed, those case-management
norms, while valuable, were overshadowed by the significant differences in
substantive law among the circuits.314 Thus, courts that are interested in
competing for litigants may find that the suite of administrative procedures
they can offer is more attractive to forum-shopping plaintiffs in the Federal
Circuit era because plaintiffs cannot shop for substantive legal differences.
The presence of a centralized appellate court for patent cases may also
level the playing field for courts to compete for litigants, thereby increasing
the number of district courts that can realistically enter into competition.
During the pre–Federal Circuit era, only district courts in pro-plaintiff
circuits (the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits) could realistically compete
for litigants.315 Even those districts, however, were bound by different
standards and rules on patent law than other courts in other circuits. Those
Trial Court with a Specialization in Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 765,
770 (2000) (explaining that “rampant forum shopping” was a major cause of the creation of the
Federal Circuit); Arti K. Rai, Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 877, 877-78 (2002) (recognizing that commentators have suggested that the creation of
specialized patent trial courts could reduce forum shopping and legal inconsistency at the trial
level).
314 See supra subsection II.A.1.
315 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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differences might limit any one districts’ appeal to litigants. Or those
districts might reside in circuits that had unappealing precedent on
procedural questions that might be important to particular patent plaintiffs.
And even then, forces outside of the trial court’s control (such as changes to
the law, a shift in the appellate court’s support for the patent system) might
undermine any efforts to attract litigants. The result was that very few (if
any) district courts could offer the sorts of procedural and administrative
advantages that would appeal to a significant number of plaintiffs.
The creation of the Federal Circuit essentially commoditized patent
litigation. Now, every district court in the country operates with the same
baseline law and the same court reviewing procedural and discretionary
decisions.316 That means that any district court that is interested in
attracting patent cases can attempt to do so without circuit-specific
limitations. While before the Federal Circuit plaintiffs shopped for law,
now they shop for trial practices and procedures.
Specialization at the trial court level may increase court competition in
different ways than specialization at the appellate level does. Specialized
trial judges may be more incentivized than generalist judges to compete for
litigants. In particular, specialized judges may see more value in obtaining
the reputational benefits that come from increased expertise. Most
specialized trial judges want to be seen as experts in their specialty;
bankruptcy judges, presumably, hope to be recognized as experts in
bankruptcy law. The benefit to a generalist judge of becoming an expert in
a particular field is less apparent; peer generalist judges are unlikely to be
impressed by a particular judicial expertise.
Additionally, specialized trial courts are likely to experience more direct
bureaucratic rewards when successfully competing for cases than generalist
courts are. LoPucki has detailed the bureaucratic rewards that the
bankruptcy court in Delaware received after increasing the court’s caseload,
namely increased judgeships and money for the court.317 Of course, the
success with which the Eastern District of Texas and the District of
Delaware have attracted patent cases demonstrates that specialized courts
are not the only courts that are incentivized to compete for litigants. But

316 Although the Federal Circuit formally reviews non-patent procedural questions under the
law of the geographic circuit, the court has largely looked to its own precedents for procedural
questions in patent cases. See Dreyfuss, supra note 12, at 30-52 (pointing to confusion caused by
the Federal Circuit in three specific areas: jurisdiction, adjudication of non-patent aspects of
cases, and supervision of lower courts in partnership with regional circuits).
317 LOPUCKI, supra note 17, at 128-29.
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specialized trial courts may be particularly motivated to attract cases to
justify the court’s very existence.
Another specialized court that handles patent cases provides an
interesting example. The United States International Trade Commission
(ITC) is a quasi-judicial federal agency that adjudicates disputes regarding
U.S. imports.318 The ITC is limited in the remedies it can provide to
plaintiffs: it cannot grant monetary damages; instead, it can only restrict
imports of products that infringe a valid U.S. patent. Despite that
limitation, the ITC receives a large number of patent cases every year,
reaching a high of seventy cases in 2011, before averaging just over forty
over the past two years.319 The ITC’s importance in the patent system has
increased significantly in the past decade.320 The administrative law judges
(ALJs) of the ITC are considered specialists in patent law. The ALJs are
also highly aware of the impact that their patent caseload has on certain
bureaucratic matters, namely ITC judgeships and courtroom space. For
instance, in the ITC’s annual report, the Commission has said that the
significant increase of cases over the past five years has led to “[a] shortage
of courtrooms,” which has “hampered scheduling of evidentiary
hearings.”321 The courtroom shortage due to the increased caseload led to
the acquisition of additional space and the construction of a new courtroom
in October 2012.322 Similarly, former Chief Administrative Law Judge Paul
Luckern has noted that he thinks the ITC currently has enough judges
(six), “[b]ut things could change. The caseload could increase.”323 The
judges on the ITC are aware that increased caseloads lead directly to
increased judgeships and other potential benefits to the Commission, such
as new courtrooms. That sort of direct link between increased caseloads of a

318 See About the USITC, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.usitc.gov/
press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/6QBK-U67C.
319 See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, FACTS AND TRENDS REGARDING USITC SECTION
337 INVESTIGATIONS 1 (2013), available at http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/documents/featured_news/
337facts.pdf.
320 See David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade Commission, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1702 (2009) (“[O]nly recently has [the ITC] become a popular forum
for adjudication of patent infringement claims.”).
321 See U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, supra note 319, at 1.
322 Id.
323 An Interview with the Honorable Paul J. Luckern, Chief Administrative Law Judge of the US International Trade Commission, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. NEWS ( June 28, 2011), https://www.dlapiper.com/
en/us/insights/publications/2011/06/an-interview-with-the-honorable-paul-j-luckern-c__/, archived
at https://perma.cc/SJ76-AZCY.
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particular type of case and institutional benefits is more obvious on
specialized courts than on generalist ones.
All this is not to say that court competition can only occur in specialized
courts. Forum shopping is not unique to fields of law that have specialized
courts.324 Furthermore, scholars have surmised that court competition for
cases could occur in virtually any field of law.325 Clearly the potential
correlation between specialization and court competition is not the only
explanation for the rise of competition that has occurred in bankruptcy and
patent law. Those fields’ broad venue statutes have allowed numerous courts
to compete for litigants. Charismatic judges that can set a court’s agenda
have also played key roles in both patent law and bankruptcy’s court
competition history. But the history of court competition in areas governed
by specialized courts suggests that creating specialized courts may increase
the incentives and opportunities for courts to compete for litigation.
Lawmakers who understand the potential downsides of court
competition can better structure specialized courts to avoid the problems
that have arisen in patent and bankruptcy litigation. For example, when
creating specialized courts, lawmakers should consider the venue provisions
that accompany the new court’s jurisdiction. In patent law, for instance,
court competition could have been reduced if litigants simply had fewer
venue choices.326 Similarly, bankruptcy law’s forum shopping problem
began when statutory changes to the venue statute enabled courts to
compete among themselves for business.327

324 Mississippi courts, for example, have long been a hotbed of class action litigation. See,
e.g., Adam Liptak, Court Has Dubious Record as a Class-Action Leader: Critics Say Victims Lose, Even
If They Win, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2002, at A14 (attributing the appeal of Mississippi courts to a
propensity to approve lawyer-friendly settlements).
325 See, e.g., Daniel Klerman, Personal Jurisdiction and Product Liability, 85 S. CAL. L. REV.
1551, 1554 (2012) (suggesting that states might compete to attract business to the state by
“weakening their product liability law or otherwise tilting their procedural and choice-of-law rules
to favor defendants”).
326 Recently, Congress seriously considered, but ultimately chose not to amend the patent
venue statute. See Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 8(a) (proposing limitations
on available venues for litigants). In previous work, I have argued that the venue provisions were
removed from the America Invents Act due to interbranch dialogue between Congress and the
Federal Circuit. See J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1070-71 (2014)
(arguing that the venue provisions were removed due to the actions of the Federal Circuit that
altered the law that Congress was seeking to reform). See generally Jonas Anderson, Congress as a
Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 961 (2014) (cataloguing the
dialogue between Congress and the Federal Circuit during the passage of the AIA).
327 See LOPUCKI, supra note 17, at 15 (tracing the development of bankruptcy venue
provisions “that allowed the bankruptcy court competition to develop”).
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The second lesson for lawmakers is that appellate courts need to be
more diligent in supervising trial court practices in areas of specialized
adjudication. The Federal Circuit, for its part, has begun to take steps in
this direction, as it has begun to review denials of motions to transfer much
more rigorously than it had previously done.328 District courts would be
well-advised to similarly police the case management practices of their
bankruptcy courts.
C. Reducing Forum Shopping and Court Competition
To reduce forum shopping in the patent system, policymakers must
also reduce courts’ ability to compete for litigants. This Section reviews
current academic and congressional proposals to reduce forum shopping in
patent law. All of these proposals share a common feature: they seek to
greatly reduce, if not eliminate, discretion in litigant venue decisions.
Building on these proposals, this Section analyzes other as-yet unstudied
means of reducing court competition in patent cases.
1. Scholarly Proposals
Scholars who view patent forum shopping as problematic have put forth
a number of proposals designed to reduce the practice. Those proposals
generally involve one of two solutions: (1) the creation of specialized patent
trial courts or (2) reduced venue options for litigants.329
Kimberly Moore has proposed the creation of a specialized trial court
for patent cases that would be reviewed by another specialized court, the
Federal Circuit.330 Moore’s proposed creation of a single trial court to
handle all patent trials would completely eliminate forum shopping because
“there would be no possible alternative forum.”331 Other scholars have made
similar proposals.332
Judicial specialization does not, of course, fend off competition between
courts. The bankruptcy courts’ long history of court competition
demonstrates the potential for competition among specialized courts. Most

328

See supra notes 262-267 and accompanying text.
See Fromer, supra note 9, at 1466-67 (describing the two ways that critics of forum
shopping have suggested to “clamp down” on the problem: a specialized trial court or restrictions
on venue choices).
330 Moore, supra note 5, at 932.
331 Id.
332 See, e.g., Rai, supra note 313, at 877-78 (outlining a proposal for the creation of a
specialized patent trial court).
329
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proposals for a specialized patent trial court, however, envision a single
court that would handle all cases and would therefore have no other court
against which to compete.333 While specialized courts of the sort envisioned
by Judge Moore would eliminate forum shopping (and competition for
litigants) by eliminating alternate courts, specialized trial courts have
potential downsides as well, including narrowness of vision and capture.334
Scholars have also proposed changes to the patent venue statute.335 For
instance, Jeanne Fromer has proposed “making patent venue proper only in
the district in which the principal place of business of any of a case’s
defendants is located, with a safety valve to avoid due process concerns,
which might occur in a minute number of cases.”336 Restricting venue in
patent law is likely to decrease forum shopping because it will limit courts’
ability to compete for litigants.337 The more restrictive the options, the less
competition will exist. Restricting venue limits a court’s ability to attract
litigants and therefore decreases the likelihood that any particular court will
craft rules or norms specifically designed to attract plaintiffs. Such a change
would shift courts’ focus back to crafting rules and norms that streamline
the litigation on the docket—rather than shape the docket in the first
place—and would be a welcome modification to the patent system.
Of course, venue restrictions do not automatically eliminate court
competition for litigants. Indeed, bankruptcy has a more restrictive venue
statute than patent law,338 yet it has been afflicted with persistent forum
shopping and court competition.339 Bankruptcy courts in districts that are
home to large numbers of corporate headquarters (or, in Delaware’s case,
the state of incorporation) were able to compete for litigation because many
large bankruptcy actions satisfied the requisite venue and jurisdictional
requirements. While not every bankruptcy court could compete successfully
for litigants, the Delaware court could.
The same holds true for patent law—not all proposals to restrict venue
would eliminate forum shopping. For example, Judge Moore has proposed
limiting venue in patent cases “based on [a] defendant’s residence and state
333

Moore, supra note 5, at 932.
Rai, supra note 313, at 895-97 (discussing arguments against the creation of a specialized
patent trial court).
335 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 5, at 936-37 (concluding that “modification of the patent
venue statute” could increase the efficiency of dispute resolution “with minimal upheaval”).
336 Fromer, supra note 9, at 1447.
337 See id. at 1478-79 (arguing that restricting venue to a litigant’s principal place of business
will decrease forum shopping and in turn promote more skilled decisionmaking).
338 See supra notes 293-94 and accompanying text.
339 See supra notes 295-312 and accompanying text.
334
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of incorporation.”340 Adopting Judge Moore’s proposal would likely
decrease the number of cases filed in the Eastern District of Texas due to an
inability to compete with courts that have more contacts with broader
swaths of potential defendants. Her proposal would not, however,
significantly reduce the overall competition for patent litigation. Even
though a restricted venue statute often limits the number of courts that can
compete for litigants, it does not eliminate such competition. In fact, as
LoPucki has shown in the bankruptcy context, competition between courts
can be quite robust even when only two courts are involved.341 Indeed, any
venue statute that relies on state of incorporation merely tilts the
competitive playing field in Delaware’s favor.
Jeanne Fromer’s proposed venue modification—combined with the new
joinder rules of the America Invents Act (AIA)—would likely eliminate
court competition from patent litigation. Because the AIA restricts joinder
of accused defendants to cases arising out of the “same transaction [or]
occurrence” of infringement,342 patent plaintiffs usually must bring suit
against defendants on an individual basis. Thus, since Fromer’s proposal
limits venue to the defendant’s principal place of business,343 there would
be only one available venue per patent suit.
2. Congressional Proposals
Congress has also shown an interest in tinkering with the patent venue
statute. Early versions of the AIA contained alterations to the venue statute
that would have limited venue to jurisdictions where (a) defendant had its
principal place of business or (b) infringement occurred and the defendant
had an established business.344 Later versions loosened the restrictions on
venue by permitting venue in the location in which the plaintiff resides as
long as the plaintiff was an individual inventor or institution of higher
learning.345 Ultimately, however, Congress passed a version of the AIA
which contained no changes to the patent venue statute.346
But Congress has enacted one change to patent case assignments that
has the potential to significantly impact forum shopping. Arising from
340

Moore, supra note 5, at 934.
See LOPUCKI, supra note 17, at 74 (discussing competition between bankruptcy courts in
New York and Delaware).
342 35 U.S.C. § 299(a)(1) (2012).
343 Fromer, supra note 9, at 1477.
344 Anderson, Congress as a Catalyst, supra note 326, at 986.
345 Id. at 993 n.10.
346 Id. at 1004.
341
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academic arguments for specialized adjudication in patent law, Congress
began the Patent Pilot Program (PPP) in 2011.347 The PPP allows selected
district courts to create a subgroup of judges within the district that are
preselected to handle patent cases filed in the district.348
While the PPP was designed to increase expertise among judges
handling patent cases, it may also lead to increased competition among
those judges for patent cases. Before the creation of the PPP, district courts
with large numbers of judges (such as the Northern District of California
and the Northern District of Illinois) were largely unable to compete with
the smaller district courts (such as the Eastern District of Texas, the
District of Delaware, and the Western District of Wisconsin) for patent
cases. In the competition for litigants, districts with fewer judges have
multiple advantages over larger districts in the market for patent litigation.
First, smaller districts are more able to develop an expertise in a
particular area. For instance, the District of Delaware has four activeservice judges.349 Because of the small number of judges on the court and
the high number of patent cases on the docket, each judge has a large
number of docketed patent cases at any one time. In 2009 alone, each active
judge averaged over fifty new patent cases assigned to his or her docket.350
Contrast the District of Delaware with the Central District of California,
which received the most patent filings of any district in 2009. The Central
District has twenty-seven active judges.351 Again assuming that senior
judges are not assigned any patent cases, the average Central District judge
received around nine patent cases in 2009. Thus, judges in small districts
can acquire expertise more quickly than judges in large districts.
Second, smaller districts can unify district norms. A large district, like
the Southern District of New York, confronts a collective action problem
when adopting local rules or informal norms governing cases. The twentyeight judges in the district are distinct individuals, some of whom may want
to see an increase in a certain type of litigation and some of whom may
prefer precisely the opposite. Smaller districts, on the other hand, have
fewer potential judges willing to resist the move towards district-wide
conformity. Indeed, the list of districts that have adopted PLRs is filled
347

Patent Cases Pilot Program, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011).
Id.
349 28 U.S.C. § 133(a) (2012). In addition to the four active judges, the District of Delaware
currently has one senior judge.
350 This does not include senior judges who, in most districts, can take patent cases if they so
desire. Most senior judges do not choose to do so.
351 28 U.S.C. § 133(a) (2012). An unfilled vacancy exists on the court as of the time of this
writing.
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with districts that are among the top ten districts for annual patent
filings352 and districts with fewer than eleven judges.353 Of the four largest
districts in the country—those with over twenty judges—only the Northern
District of Illinois has adopted PLRs, despite the prevalence of patent
litigation in many of those large districts.354
Third, small districts can more easily adopt a unified judicial philosophy
with an eye towards attracting litigation. For the same reasons outlined
above, collective action problems make unification of large districts much
more difficult than smaller ones. For example, rocket dockets tend to arise
in smaller districts because the judges are more capable of acting as a
collective to reduce backlog.355
Fourth, small districts enjoy the benefits of reduced uncertainty in the
judge assignment process. In the Western District of Wisconsin, which has
only two active-service judges,356 potential plaintiffs can assume a 50%
probability of being assigned to a particular judge. The Central District of
California, on the other hand, presents much greater uncertainty in
predicting one’s judge.
Fifth, small districts, like small companies, can be more responsive to
changes in the market. When new procedural issues arise in patent
litigation, smaller districts can quickly alter their rules or norms to improve
the litigation experience in their district.
Given all of the competitive advantages of small districts, the PPP may
merely level the competitive playing field for large districts. Now, large
districts like the Northern District of Illinois can theoretically compete
with smaller districts because, for patent cases only, they operate much like
a small district court. While the PPP is likely to increase judicial

352 This includes the Eastern District of Texas, the Northern District of California, the
District of Massachusetts, the Northern District of Illinois, the District of New Jersey, the
Southern District of California, and the District of Minnesota.
353 The districts with PLRs and the number of judges in those districts are the Northern
District of California (14), the Southern District of California (13), the Western District of
Washington (7), the Northern District of Texas (12), the Eastern District of Texas (7), the
Southern District of Texas (19), the Western District of Wisconsin (2), the District of Minnesota
(7), the Northern District of Illinois (22), the Western District of Pennsylvania (10), the Northern
District of Georgia (11), the Eastern District of Virginia (11), the Eastern District of North
Carolina (4), the District of New Jersey (17), the District of Massachusetts (13), and the Northern
District of Ohio (11). 28 U.S.C. § 133(a) (2012).
354 Historically, the Central District of California and the Southern District of New York are
among the top ten filing districts. See Lemley, supra note 2, at 405 tbl.2.
355 See Vishnubhakat, supra note 141, at 68-70 (discussing the characteristics of rocket
dockets).
356 28 U.S.C. § 133(a) (2012).
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specialization in patent cases, it also may allow more districts to enter into
the competition for litigants.
3. Other Potential Methods of Reducing Court Competition
There are ways to eliminate court competition beyond the traditional
academic approaches of venue restrictions and the creation of specialized
trial courts. One way that has been suggested in the literature on
bankruptcy forum shopping involves randomization of case assignment.
This subsection will briefly analyze the costs and benefits of three such
potential randomization procedures.
a. Randomizing Case Assignment Within Districts
First, and most painlessly, Congress could mandate that district courts
randomize assignment of patent cases within their districts. Limiting the
ability of courts, such as the Eastern District of Virginia and the Eastern
District of Texas, to deviate from random assignment procedures for patent
cases would eliminate one of the most effective efforts to attract, or
dissuade, patent litigants from filing in a court.
The Eastern District of Texas has continually had case assignment
procedures for patent cases that allow litigants to select the judge who will
preside over their case.357 Such an ability to “judge shop” has been
uniformly decried as antithetical to notions of justice.358 LoPucki notes that
the ability to “judge shop” was one of the features of Delaware bankruptcy
courts that initially appealed to bankruptcy filers.359
Congress could easily eliminate courts’ ability to permit pre-selection of
judges. Under 28 U.S.C. § 137, chief judges of district courts have the
power to “assign the cases” in accordance with the rules and orders of the
court.360 The statute grants chief judges broad discretion in assigning cases.
Congress could amend the statute to require that district courts assign cases
in a randomized manner among the judges. This modification would
eliminate one of the primary judicial means of attracting litigants with very
little cost.

357

See supra subsection II.B.2.b.i.
See supra note 223.
359 See supra note 226.
360 28 U.S.C. § 137 (2012).
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b. National Assignment of Patent Cases
Alternatively, Congress could create a more radical means of
randomizing case assignment in patent cases. For instance, Congress could
adopt nationwide jurisdiction for patent cases and randomly assign patent
cases to a subset of district judges with expertise in patent law. Under this
system, patent litigants would file cases with a national body, and then each
case would be randomly assigned to a judge with expertise in patent law.
Such a proposal would eliminate forum shopping, but would impose
significant additional costs on patent litigants that would likely outweigh
the benefits.
At first glance, assigning patent cases nationally has a number of
potential benefits. First, it eliminates the ability of judges and courts to
compete for litigants. Because patent cases would be assigned randomly on
the national level, courts would be unable to attract or dissuade litigants
from filing. Likewise, litigants would be unable to select advantageous
venues, thus eliminating forum shopping as well.
Second, because court competition would be eliminated, courts would
have no incentive to persuade litigants to file in their court by adjusting
administrative, procedural, and case management practices. Instead, courts
would be incentivized to structure their case management practices to
efficiently handle patent cases.
A third benefit would be increased judicial specialization in patent
trials. A subset of federal district judges would hear all patent cases, thus
developing expertise in patent law and patent case management, similar to
the expertise enjoyed today by some judges in Delaware and the Eastern
District of Texas. The desire to have experienced patent jurists has driven
many reform proposals in patent law, from the PPP to the creation of the
Federal Circuit.361
Of course, there are drawbacks to any radical alteration of the litigation
system, and the drawbacks of national assignment of patent cases likely
outweigh any benefits gained from reduced court competition. First, a
national assignment system would eliminate litigant choice with respect to
venue. It is a generally accepted premise of the U.S. adversarial litigation
system that a plaintiff has the right, at least initially, to bring her case in a
forum of her choice.362
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See supra subsections II.A.1-2.
See Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994) (“While a defendant
does have a right, given by statute, to remove in certain situations, plaintiff is still
the master of his own claim.”). The existence of the plaintiff-choice system does not have a
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National patent assignment would also raise constitutional questions
about jurisdiction: for a district court to hear a case, it must possess subject
matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and proper venue. Patent law has
its own venue statute that permits patent infringement suits to be brought
in any district where (1) the defendant resides or (2) “the defendant has
committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of
business.”363 Following the 1988 amendment to the general venue statute,
the Federal Circuit has interpreted a corporation’s residence as any district
in which personal jurisdiction lies.364 Therefore, in patent cases, venue is
proper whenever personal jurisdiction exists.
For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction, the defendant need only
have “minimum contacts” with the forum.365 If patent cases were randomly
assigned, these requirements would be easily met in most cases; companies
that offer products nationally are likely to be subject to the personal
jurisdiction of a large number of district courts, if not all ninety-four U.S.
district courts.366 In some cases, however, minimum contacts would not
exist.
Antitrust law provides a potential statutory fix to this problem. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A) requires that federal courts follow the
jurisdictional requirements imposed by the states in which those courts
reside.367 However, an exception to that rule is provided in Rule 4(k)(1)(C),
which recognizes that Congress has the authority to create nationwide
jurisdiction for federal question cases.368 Thus, Congress could establish
nationwide jurisdiction for all patent cases. By doing so, Congress could
enable nationwide case assignment and eliminate jurisdictional limits on all

strong theoretical pedigree, however. See Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Roots of
Removal, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 2 n.4 (2011) (noting that while the scholarly commentary on the
issue is lacking, it is “the baseline norm that . . . plaintiffs have the initial choice of judicial
system . . . and the place of trial (venue)”).
363 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012).
364 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1990); see
also Moore, supra note 5, at 896-97 (describing the conflation of the patent venue statute and the
general venue statute in patent cases); Thomas A. O’Rourke, The Modernization of the Patent Venue
Statute, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 585, 600 (1992) (concluding that the standards for personal
jurisdiction and venue are identical in patent cases).
365 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985).
366 Moore, supra note 5, at 897.
367 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
368 See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(C) (permitting personal jurisdiction “when authorized by a
federal statute”).
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patent cases. Congress has done this with antitrust cases, permitting
nationwide jurisdiction for Sherman Act cases.369
Ultimately, nationalizing the patent assignment system is undesirable
because it throws the baby out with the bathwater.370 If all cases were
randomly assigned nationally, patent plaintiffs would quite often be forced
to litigate away from “home.” For those patent plaintiffs that are small
entities, being assigned to a far-away district court could represent a
significant financial burden.371 Indeed, while the districts of Delaware and
Eastern Texas oversee a large portion of patent litigation in the United
States, a significant portion of the patent litigation in other districts
involves small entities. Colleen Chien has found that around 18% of patent
plaintiffs are small companies, nonprofits, or individuals.372 Such plaintiffs
would be significantly burdened if forced to litigate in a random district.
Thus, a dramatic change to patent litigation, like a national assignment
system, would potentially impose additional costs on those least able to
bear them and would be politically unfeasible.
c. Judicial Assignment of Venue
As a third option, patent cases could be assigned to the most convenient
district as determined by a judicial panel. A similar process occurs with
Multi-District Litigation (MDL). In civil actions “involving one or more
common questions of fact . . . pending in different districts,” the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation—a special entity within the U.S. federal
court system—determines whether multiple actions should be consolidated
in a single court for pretrial proceedings.373 The Judicial Panel is comprised
of seven judges from different circuits who are appointed by the Chief
Justice of the United States.374 In theory, patent cases could be submitted to
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15 U.S.C. § 5 (2012).
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371 See id. at 48 (discussing the costs associated with random assignment of cases, including
increased regional attorney fees and increased travel costs).
372 Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the
Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1600 tbl.3 (2009).
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a similarly constructed panel, which would then select the venue with the
greatest ties to the case.
While such a procedure would likely result in a more equitable and
rational assignment of patent cases in most instances, it would impose an
additional layer of complexity and cost to the patent system. Indeed, a
judicial panel for patent case assignment would be much more burdensome
than that for MDL. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation issued
432 orders in 2013, its highest number on record.375 In contrast, nearly the
same number of patent cases was filed in district courts in the month of
December 2013 alone.376 Any patent assignment panel would have to resolve
venue for over ten times the number of cases decided by the Judicial Panel
on MDL—a costly judicial undertaking. Thus, while such an assignment
panel could improve the patent system, the increased administrative costs
would have to be carefully considered.
CONCLUSION
Forum shopping in patent law is fueled in part by competition among
courts to attract litigants. Courts engage in court competition for a host of
reasons, including prestige, increased budget outlays, or personal interest in
particular types of cases. Courts can compete for litigants by establishing
predictable practices—some administrative, some procedural—that appeal
to particular plaintiffs.
Court competition in patent law parallels the court competition that has
occurred in bankruptcy law. In both areas, courts have attracted litigants by
permitting “judge shopping,” creating unique procedural rules that were
seen as pro-plaintiff, and adopting predictable case management norms that
appealed to plaintiffs. In patent law, unlike bankruptcy, some courts have
sought to dissuade litigants from filing in their courtrooms. In patent law,
as in bankruptcy law, the competition for litigants has at times led to an
unfair disadvantage to defendants.
Previous scholarly proposals to limit venue or create a specialized patent
court have the potential to reduce or eliminate court competition, but also
carry a number of drawbacks. Randomizing judge assignment also has the
potential to reduce patent forum shopping but has yet to be considered by
375
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academics studying the patent system. Ultimately, Congress should require
district courts to assign cases randomly among the district’s judges, perhaps
in conjunction with tightened venue requirements for patent cases. While
most districts already employ randomized patent case assignment, some
districts have used nonrandom assignment to either attract or repel patent
filers. Requiring random assignment would not wholly eliminate court
competition in patent cases, but it would remove one of the primary means
by which courts seek to attract litigants to their courtrooms.

